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FEDERAL CONSULTATION WITH INDIAN TRIBES:
THE FOUNDATION OF ENLIGHTENED POLICY
DECISIONS, OR ANOTHER BADGE OF SHAME?
Derek C. Haskew*
We were better able to understand how [tribes] felt on many very
important issues. Their testimony did make a difference in our
final product. That is why Tribal consultation is important.
Tribes, more than anyone else, know what is best for them. They
know better than anyone else what policies would be bad for
them
- Phillip Martin'
They sat there through presentation after presentation by the
Tribe, fooling us into believing that there could be a sincere
dialogue between the federal government and its constituents....
We made countless proposals. We got nothing of substance back,
no effort on their part to even meet us part way. Instead of
dialogue and a respectful exchange of ideas, we were stonewalled.
- Pauline Esteves2
L Introduction
The proliferation of tribal consultation requirements in federal statutes and
policies3 is arguably a laudable first step toward a mature understanding by the
* Managing Attorney, DNA-People's Legal Services, Inc., Halchita, Navajo Nation. For
their guidance and editorial assistance, I would like to thank Frederick Marr, Michael J. Brennan,
Claudeen Bates Arthur, Nell Jessup Newton, Denise Meyer, and my father, Paul J. Haskew,
without whose encouragement this project would not have been completed.
1. Prepared Testimony of Phillip Martin, Chief, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, Box
6010 Choctaw Branch, Philadelphia Mississippi, 39350, Before the Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs on Bureau of Indian Affairs Reorganization, FED. NEWS SERV., May 18, 1995, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File [hereinafter Testimony of Phillip Martin].
2. Secretary Babbitt Promises to Throw the Timbisha Shoshone Off Their Ancestral
Homeland in Death Valley (Mar. 7, 1997) (press release issued by the Timbisha Shoshone Tribe
of Indians, on file with the author).
3. See, e.g., Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-575, § 4006(a), 106 Stat. 4600, 4757 ("Each federal agency must carry out its process for
identifying and evaluating historic properties in consultation with, inter alia, Indian tribes and
Native Hawaiian organizations.") (amending 16 U.S.C. § 470h-2); Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203; Indian Self-Determination
Act Amendments of 1994, § 102(18), Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250, 4259 (amending
section 106(i)); Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-601,
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§ 5, 104 Stat. 3048, 3052 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3003 (1994)) ("The inventories and
identifications required [under this section] shall be ... completed in consultation with tribal
government[s]"); Clean Water Act § 518, 33 U.S.C. 1377 (1994); Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(d), 9626(a), 9604(c)(2)
(1994) (stating that Indian tribes are to be treated ai states for purposes of that subsection); 25
U.S.C. § 3502 (1994) ("In implementing the provisions of [the Energy Policy Act of 1992], the
Secretary of Energy shall involve and consult with Indian tribes to the maximum extent possible
and where appropriate and shall do so in a manner that is consistent with the Federal trust and
the Government-to-Government relationships between Indian tribes and the Federal
Government."); 25 U.S.C. § 3612 (1994) ("Mhe Secretary [of the Interior], in consultation with
Indian tribes shall ... conduct a survey of conditions of tribal justice systems and Courts of
Indian Offenses... [and] shall actively consult with Indian tribes and tribal organizations in the
development and conduct of the surveys."); 42 U.S.C. § 10,137 (1994) ("Consultation with States
and affected Indian Tribes"); 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994) ("Protection and preservation of traditional
religions of Native Americans"); 7 C.F.R. §§ 272.1,272.2, 272.3, 281.1,281.2, 281.4, 1994.674,
1995.9, 3100.45 (1997); 10 C.F.R. §§ 60.18, 60.62, 960.3, 960.3-2-1, 960.3-3, 960.5-2-6,
1021.215 (1997); 12 C.F.R. § 1805.901 (1997); 13 C.F.R. § 301.4 (1997); 15 C.F.R. §§ 922.152,
922.154 (1997); 18 C.F.R. §§ 4.32, 4.35, 4.38, 4.105, 16.8, 1312.5, 1312.7, 1312.6 (1997), 20
C.F.R. §§ 632.10, 632.171 (1997); 22 C.F.R. § 1104.15 (1997); 24 C.F.R. §§ 950.115, 950.962,
950.970, 950.3025 (1997); 25 C.F.R. §§ 1.4, 20.1, 20.25 (1997); 25 C.F.R. § 32.2 (1997)
("'Consultation' means a conferring process with Tribes, Alaska Native entities, and Tribal
organizations on a periodic and systematic basis in which the Bureau and Department officials
listen to and give effect, to the extent they can, to the views of these entities"); 25 C.F.R. §§ 32.4,
33.9, 36.3, 36.11, 383, 38.7, 39.2, 39.22, 39.94, 39.131, 82.5, 83.12, 87.4, 87.7, 89.41, 163.1,
163.3 (1997); 25 C.F.R. § 164.14 (1997) ("On individually owned Indian forest land ... the
Secretary may, after consultation, sell the forest products without the consent of the owner(s)
when in his or her judgment such action is necessary to prevent loss of value from fire,
insects . . . ."); 25 C.F.R. § 163.20 (1997) ("The Secretary may, after consultation with any
legally appointed guardian, execute contracts on behalf, of minors ... ."); 25 C.F.R. §§ 163.28,
163.31, 163A0, 166.5 (1997); 25 C.F.R. § 211.20 (1997) (mineral leases); 25 C.F.R. §§ 211.28,
216.12, 241.6, 249.1 (1997); 25 C.F.R. § 262.4 (1997) (allowing agents of tribes to abbreviate
consultation requirements); 25 C.F.R. §§ 262.5, 263.3, 273.3, 273.18, 273.31 (1997); 25 C.F.R.
§§ 700.337, 700.717, 700.719, 700.831 (1997); 25 C.F.R. §§ 900.3, 900.87 (1997); 25 C.F.R. §
900.119 (1997) ("Mhe Secretary shall consult with any Indian tribe or tribal organization(s) that
would be significantly affected by the expenditure to determine and to follow tribal preferences
to the greatest extent feasible.");. 25 C.F.R. §§ 900.131, 900.181, 1001.10, 1200.43 (1997); 28
C.F.R. §§ 31.301 (1997); 28 C.F.R. § 90.11 (1997) (developing anti-domestic violence programs);
28 C.F.R. §§ 90.51, 90.57 (1997); 30 C.F.R. §§ 228.102, 715.11, 750.6, 876.12, 886.25 (1997);
32 C.F.R. §§ 229.7, 229.16 (1997); 34 C.F.R. Pt. 325, App. C (1997); 34 C.F.R. §§ 222.91,
222.94, 361.18, 410.22 (1997); 36 C.F.R. §§ 7.28, 79.4 (1997); 36 C.F.R. § 296.7 (1997)
(protection of historic and cultural properties); 36 C.F.R. §§ 296.16, 800.1, 800.5, 800.7, 800.11
(1997); 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.35, 192.01, 192.20, 307.23, 1501.2 (1997); 42 C.F.R. 36.15 (1997); 42
C.F.R. § 36.16 (1997) ("Indian Health Service may consult with the appropriate tribe or the
Bureau of Indian Affairs on outstanding questions regarding an applicant's tribal member-
ship .... "); 42 C.F.R. §§ 36.117, 36.203 (1997); 43 C.F.R. §§ 7.7 (1997) ("The Federal land
manager should also seek to determine, in consultation with official representatives of Indian
tribes .... what circumstances should be the subject of special notification to the tribe .... );
43 C.F.R. §§ 7.16, 7.33, 7.35, 10.3, 10.5, 10.8, 10.9, 10.10, 417.5 (1997); 43 C.F.R. § 3420.0-2
(1997); 43 C.F.R. § 3420.1-7 (1997) (competitive mineral leasing procedures); 43 C.F.R. §§
3420.2, 3420.4-4, 3461.5, 4180.2, 10010.2, 10010.5, 10010.9 (1997); 45 C.F.R. §§ 250.93,
250.94, 1357.10, 1357.15, 1357.16, 2503.4 (1997) 48 C.F.R. PHS 352.280-4 (1997); 49 C.F.R.
§ 397.71 (1997); 50 C.F.R. § 660.324 (1997); see also John E. Silverman, The Miner's Canary:
Tribal Control of American Indian Education and the First Amendment, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J,
1019, 1025 (1992) (concerning the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of
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federal government of the sovereignty of Native American tribes Indeed,
successful consultations between tribal liaisons and federal decision makers -
far beyond the halls of Congress - can contribute to the creation of more
enlightened, better constructed, and more effective federal policies, projects, and
regulations.5 However, "consultation" remains an ill-defined term in the context
of recent (fashionable) use by Congress, the President, and other federal
policymakers. Consultation requirements vest tribes with uncertain benefits and
create an unsettled set of responsibilities for federal stewards, most prominently
the Secretary of the Interior and Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs.
A useful definition of "meaningful consultation" is found in Lower Brule
Sioux Tribe v. Deer,6 which explains what potentially takes place during the
formal process of consultations between federal agencies and tribal government
officials. The typical consultation described in Lower Brule Sioux would have
taken place between the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the tribe:
[c]onsultation comprised a one to two hour meeting, not more than
one half day, during which meeting the [BIA] superintendent
notifies the Council of the BIAs proposed action, justifying his
reasoning. The Tribal Council may either issue a motion or
1975) ("Funding was conditioned upon program development in consultation with Indian parents
and approval by an Indian parent committee; still, the Act failed to provide for tribal control.");
Peter W. Sly & Cheryl A. Maier, Indian Water Settlements and EPA, NAT. RESOURCES & ENVr,
Spring 1991, at 23, 24 (noting that the Clean Water Act requires "EPA, in consultation with states
and tribes, to establish a dispute resolution mechanism to avoid unreasonable consequences that
may arise from states and tribes having differing standards on a shared water body").
4. Throughout this article I have used the terms "Native American," "indigenous peoples,"
and "Indian" interchangeably. The lattermost term seems to be the most pervasive, and Indian
activist Russell Means recommends use of the term "Indian," which was the label voted most
acceptable by an assembly of indigenous peoples from North and South America. See RUSSELL
MEANS & MARVIN J. WOLF, VHERE WHITE MEN FEAR TO TREAD: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
RUSSELL MEANS 370 (1995).
5. See, e.g., Testimony of Phillip Martin, supra note 1; Prepared Statement of Wendell
Chino, President, Mescalaro Apache Tribe and Bernie Teba, Santa Clara Pueblo of New Mexico,
Before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs Hearing on the Joint Tribal/BIA/DOI Advisory
Task Force on BIA Reorganization Report, FED. NEWS SERv., May 18, 1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Arenws File ("As a result of this participatory consultation process, Tribes have
been full partners in the recommendations presented."); William W. Quinn, Jr., Federal
Acknowledgment of American Indian Tribes: Authority, Judicial Interposition, and 25 C.F.R. §
83, 17 AM. INDIAN. L. REV. 37, 46 n.21 (1992) (citing an "almost unprecedented" series of
consultations preceding the publication of 25 C.F.R. §§ 83.1-.11); Prepared Testimony of Robert
R. Nordhaus, General Counsel Department of Energy Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations United States Senate, FED. NEWS.
SERV., June 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File [hereinafter Testimony of
Robert Nordhaus] ("[E]arly consultation with the public and affected States and Tribes ... can
help save money by identifying important issues and avoiding unnecessary or insufficient
analyses.").
6. 911 F. Supp. 395, 401 (D.S.D. 1995).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
resolution of support for the decision, or reject the decision. The
tribe recognizes that the BIA need not obey the Council's decision.
Meaningful consultation means tribal consultation in advance with
the decision maker or with intermediaries with clear authority to
present tribal views to the BIA decision maker. The decision maker
is to comply with BIA and administration policies.7
This definition omits all the procedures that would precede any such meeting,
such as notice and response, which are generally understood to be a part of the
consultation process But more importantly, while this definition is perhaps a
useful starting point, it fails to note the larger perspective, more subtle
meanings, and contentious issues that are at the heart of federal-tribal
consultations as they have come to be practiced. This article explores the
problematic social and political dynamics and legal issues that underlie the
obvious meaning of "consultation."
A. The Importance of Tribal Consultations
The image of an Indian and a white man meeting to talk is evocative of the
romanticized negotiations of yesteryear. This image in turn is inextricably linked
to lore of the Indian, defeated by fate yet participating in good faith, and the
white man's subsequent betrayals. I will not examine the lore," but offer the
image as a starting point for the argument that consultations may be one method
by which that betrayal is perpetrated today. By this view, the purpose of
consultation requirements is to satisfy the desires of Native Americans to be
involved in decisions that affect them, while not binding the government to
anything resembling a commitment. Consultations, therefore, may confuse the
real consent of Indian communities to federal actions with the procedural
illusion of participation, in which Indian consent is never really asked for, and
advice is never really heeded.
A more savory view of consultations is that government recognizes the
wisdom of considering the unique perspectives of Native Americans during
policy debate, and is making every effort to incorporate those views and
interests in federal planning. Or, finally, consultations might be described in
both of these ways, depending on which players and which projects are being
discussed. Whichever view we choose to adopt at the outset of this inquiry, it
should be clear that what may be at stake in consultations is the heart of this
nation's relationship with its indigenous population.
7. Id. at 401 (citing Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Christie, 812 F.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1987)) (citation
omitted) (emphasis supplied).
8. See, e.g., U.S. DEP T OF THE INTERIOR, PROTECTION OF INDIAN TRUST RESOURCES (1996)
(published pursuant to Secretarial Order 3175. "Departmental Responsibilities for Indian Trust
Resources"}.
9. See generally JERRY MANDER, IN THE ABSENCE OF THE SACRED (1992).
[Vol. 24
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B. Organization of This Article
Part H discusses the problems with the divergent meanings of consultation
requirements. Part III is a capsule history of the federal trust relationship with
tribes, the origins of consultations, and the political storm around the issue of
tribal sovereignty, for which consultations become the natural, if not calm,
centerpoint. Part IV reviews of some of the prominent federal appellate
decisions that deal with consultation rights, to provide the reader a reference for
the types of cases in which consultation issues are pivotal to the outcome of
federal/tribal disputes.
Part V discusses how agents and agencies may not be impartial to the
outcome of these processes, and reviews some of the more important ways that
agency decision-making may be stacked against Indian interests. Consultations
may also be a tool for bureaucratic inaction. Further, the Administrative
Procedure Act's standard of review for agency decisions is too high when the
decisions involve Native American trust properties. Part VI proposes that
consultations, taken together with the federal agency decisions for which they
are the prelude, are de facto adjudications.
II. The Meanings of Consultation
At bottom, consultations are about communicating: they are the legal
mechanism used to facilitate communication between tribes and the federal
government in the context of a pending decision. This communication is
important not (only) as an end in itself, but because of its relationship to the
decision being made. However, this point may be lost on the decision makers
for whom tribal consultations are just one more procedural rung on the ladder
of bureaucratically acceptable decision-making processes. As a result, there is
a natural tension between participating parties as to the definition of a successful
consultation. For tribes, consultations will be successful when the outcome that
they advocate is adopted, in whole or in some significant part. Or, as suggested
by Navajo tradition, it may be that by talking things out, a completely different
outcome is possible, however, unforseen, and one with which everyone can
agree. For federal agencies, success may be measured merely in procedural
terms: the decision will be acceptable if and only if the proper procedures were
used to reach it, and those procedures include consulting (dutifully, if not
enthusiastically) with tribes. This tension alone is enough to make consultations
problematic.
A. Different Authorities, Different Meanings
When dealing with consultation requirements, the important question to ask
is by what authority the rules are promulgated. The various branches of the
federal government and its agencies use the same term - "consultation" - to
refer to procedures with two different legal meanings. The first referent of
consultation is the procedures required of federal agencies by statute or
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999
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published regulations. These consultation requirements can create a cause of
action for the party who the federal agency has neglected to consult, and can
result in injunctions and similar orders to ensure compliance.
The second referent is the consultation procedures promulgated by executive
agencies - independent of statutory mandate or authority - primarily pursuant
to the "government-to-government" federal tribal relationship policy of the
Clinton administration. These unpublished policies - typically available to the
public for the asking - govern the internal management of the bureaus and
agencies. The DOI has ordered each of its subordinate agencies to develop these
policies, with the caveat that all policies created pursuant to that order are "for
internal management guidance only."'" One obvious result is that the meaning
of consultation, and the institutional wisdom that supports that meaning, varies
between each branch of the DOI, and varies for each federal agency depending
on the source of the requirement."
B. Different Meanings, Damaging Results
President Clinton's directive of April 29, 1994, has resulted in the
promulgation of consultation policies that supposedly do not "grant or vest any
right to any party"'2 with whom the agency is thereby "required" to consult.
However, the promulgation of these policies, in conjunction with statutes such
as the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act 3 and a failure
to careftlly delineate internal policy from statutory duty, creates consultation
expectations on the part of tribal members, which several courts have recognized
amount to the creation of expectation rights. 4
Further, the federal trust responsibility engenders a higher standard of duty
by the federal government to tribes than Clinton's directive would seem to
suggest. This gap alone is apt to create a damaging divergence of
understanding. One commentator notes,
Although the language of [Clinton's] memorandum does much
to restore respect for, and an understanding of, the sovereign
status of tribes, it notably falls short of establishing any policy
regarding the fulfillment of the government's trust obligation
toward the tribes.... The memorandum's silence with respect
to that binding and enforceable obligation is a significant
shortcoming and leaves an ill-founded impression that the full
duty of executive agencies in dealing with tribes is simply a
10. See INTERIOR DEP'T PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 87, app. at 2 (Order No. 3175).
1!. Id
12. Id.
13. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1994).
14. See, e.g., Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707 (81h Cir. 1979);
Mescalaro Apache Tribe v. Rhoades, 804 F. Supp. 251 (D.N.M. 1992) (first heard by the court
in Mescalaro Apache Tribe v. Rhodes, 755 F. Supp. 1484 (D.N.M. 1990)).
[Vol. 24
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procedural one of consultation .... If federal officials believe
that they need only provide tribes with special procedural access
to agency decisionmaking, but then may disregard native rights
after gaining tribal input, breaches of the trust obligation will
become not only routine but seemingly sanctioned. 5
I will return to this argument below.
An apparent split between the Eighth and Ninth Circuits is indicative of the
unsettled state of this area of federal Indian law. The split is over how the
BIAs internal policy guidelines on tribal consultation should be enforced, a
disagreement that logically extends to all similar internal policy guidelines. 6
In the Eighth Circuit, the BIA argued that its policies were binding but not
applicable to the case, and the court found they were both binding and
applicable. 7 By contrast, in a remarkably similar Ninth Circuit case, the court
found the same unpublished policies nonbinding, and distinguished the Eighth
Circuit case by the fact that the BIA had there made the concession that the
policies were binding, whereas in the Ninth Circuit the BIA did not so
concede. 8
The fact that the vague term "consultation" is used to indicate two distinct
types of requirement - one enforceable, the other not - is elusive. Nowhere
is that distinction laid out except implicitly (and, as illustrated, the federal
appellate courts have not resolved the issue between themselves). Interested
parties are unlikely to have a comprehensive understanding of the source of the
authority and of the legal weight of the various federal policies, regulations,
internal management documents, case law and statutes wherein the consultation
requirements are found (assuming to begin with that such a reader - or an
Indian law practitioner, for that matter - had the savvy to know how and
where to access the relevant documents). Because there are no differences in the
term's common usage, there are also no clues to prompt such a search for the
precise meaning of the term unless one is prompted to do so by the details of
a legal battle. In the meantime, everyday usage is apt to confuse the two
referents. The fact that "consultation" has entered into the terminology of
federal-tribal government relationships means that confusions will likely
continue.
As a result, consultation requirements ultimately will damage federal-tribal
relations. 9 Tribes know that consultations can be beneficial, as they may be
15. Wood, supra note 81, at 749.
16. See Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1979); Hoopa
Valley Tribe v. Christie, 812 F.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1987).
17. Oglala Sioux, 603 F.2d at 708.
18. Hoopa Valley, 812 F.2d at 1099; see also Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. Deer, 911 F. Supp.
395, 399 (D.S.D. 1995) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit's attempt to distinguish Oglala Sioux and
Hoopa Valley).
19. See generally infra Part VII.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
the sole means of official communication between a tribe and an agency whose
actions may impinge on tribal interests. However, to the extent that an agency
is legally able to ignore its own "internal management" policies - which is to
say, to the extent that the policies or rules do not create legally enforceable
rights - a federal agency's poor behavior may reduce the tribes' willingness to
work with the agency, whether the consultations are "enforceable" or not.
C. Damazging Results, by Any Meaning
The problem with confused and confusing meanings is dwarfed by the larger
problem with consultations, which is the fact they are merely procedural by
nature. If tribal suggestions and requests are disregarded, discounted,
misundehstood or ignored when they are solicited, federal-tribal interactions are
apt to be viewed ever more suspiciously by tribes. This is a familiar
phenomenon, perhaps especially to tribal authorities. Like the parable of the boy
who cried wolf, the government that clamors for "consultation" without
providing substantive influence on the decisions is likely to soon be viewed with
greater and greater indignation, and then ignored." The wolf-crying metaphor
works on both levels of the problem, with reference to the confusion over the
meaning, and with reference to the results of the consultation effort. Worse,
tribes may develop a "learned helplessness" response, after years of being taught
that whatever they say, the only thing worth spending energy on is learning to
cope with the imposition of unacceptable alternatives' The federal agency
may in turn interpret the resulting tribal nonresponsiveness as intransigence, or
hostility (appropriately), and may in the end make decisions in reaction to those
interpretations instead of in reaction to tribal suggestions (inappropriately).
Obviously any combination of these possible results is likely to further damage
the interests of the tribe.
So this remains the ever-present criticism of consultation: even in instances
where there is a statutory duty to consult, there is no duty to be bound by the
suggestions of the consultees, and therefore consultations are ultimately
worthless. However accurate that conclusion may be, the specific failures of
consultations require more careful attention.
Il. History and Current Tensions
In the first section of this part, I review the historical underpinnings of
federal Indian law; readers familiar with the Marshall Trilogy may wish to skip
to sections B and C of this part.
20. Indeed, this suspicion and resentment is already in evidence. See infra Part V.B.
21. Pajeticing Indian law attorney and University of Southern California Adjunct Professor
Frederick Marr says he sees examples of these dynamics frequently. Interview with Frederick
Marr (n.d.) (notes on file with author).
[Vol. 24
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A. The Federal Trust Responsibility and Indigenous Nations
Consultation as it arises between the federal government and Indian tribes
cannot be fully understood separate from the legal history of federal-tribal
relations. That history begins early in the nation's history, with three case
opinions that laid the foundation for the bulk of federal Indian law. The most
influential opinions in each of these cases were drafted by Chief Justice John
Marshall, and have since become known as the Marshall trilogy.
Johnson v. Mclntosh," the first opinion of the trilogy, recognizes Indian title
in the lands they inhabit, but deems this title to be a right of occupancy, not a
fee simple absolute or its equivalent. In Johnson, Marshall determines that by
application of the European doctrine of discovery, by purchase, or by conquest,
Indian aboriginal title may be extinguished by the United States - but not by
individuals acting independently of the authority of U.S. sovereignty. Integral
to the decision is the conception that the sovereignty of Indian nations, and by
extension the legal stature of Indian people, is something less than that of the
United States and its citizens. One commentator notes,
Perhaps most important, Johnson's acceptance of the Doctrine of
Discovery into United States law represented the legacy of 1,000
years of European racism and colonialism directed against non-
Western peoples. . . .The Doctrine of Discovery's underlying
medievally derived ideology - that normatively divergent "savage"
peoples could be denied rights and status equal to those accorded
to the civilized nations of Europe - had become an integral part
of the fabric of United States federal Indian law.'
Another writes, "Whatever subtler meanings and motives underlay Marshall's
decision in Johnson v. McIntosh, one practical result is clear: it rationalized and
girded a legal framework for extinguishing Indian title."'
Eight years after Johnson, the Cherokee Nation brought an action to enjoin
the State of Georgia from routing the Cherokees and usurping their lands.
Marshall's plurality opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, was written in the
context of a monumental constitutional crisis: Georgia seemed to be thumbing
its nose at U.S. treaties with the Cherokees, and thus at the Court's authority,
with scant approbation (and possibly some encouragement) from President
22. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). The other two cases are Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
23. ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE
DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 316-17 (1990), quoted in DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 81 (3rd ed. 1993).
24. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 23, at 81.
25. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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Jackson.' Marshall had privately expressed his dismay over the Cherokees'
plight,27 but dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, holding that Indian
nations were not foreign nations for purposes of the Constitution:
[Et may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within
the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict
accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more
correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations.
They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of
their will .... Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his
guardin.
Though dictum, the italics mark perhaps the single most famous phrase in all
of federal Indian case law, as it marks the beginning of the federal trust
relationship to the tribes (as well as the patronizing attitude of the Court towards
Native Americans. Unfortunately, both have survived).
The third case in the trilogy is Worcester v. Georgia," in which a
missionary from Vermont was arrested by Georgia officials for residing in
Cherokee territory without a license from the State of Georgia to do so.
Marshall held that Indian tribes are sovereign nations, and therefore the Georgia
law can have no effect in Cherokee territory."
Taken together, these cases establish the foundation of Indian law, and the
federal duty to protect Indian interests due to their "domestic dependent nation"
status. Indian tribal sovereignty is subservient to United States sovereignty, such
that Indians hold their land at the sufferance of the greater sovereign. This
sufferance was, in turn, defined in terms of a "trust," where the federal
government "trustee" holds legal title to all Indian lands for the benefit and use
26. hi. at 128-29.
27. In a letter to a Massachusetts justice, Marshall wrote,
It was not until the adoption of our present government that respect for our own
safety permitted us to give full indulgence to those principles of humanity and
justice which ought always to govern our conduct towards the aborigines when
this course can be pursued without exposing ourselves to the most afflicting
calamities. That time, however, is unquestionably arrived, and every oppression
now exercised on a helpless people depending on our magnanimity and justice for
the preservation of character. I often think with indignation on our disreputable
conduct (as I think) in the affairs of the Cherokees in Georgia.
Letter from Chief Justice John Marshall to Justice Joseph Story (Oct. 29, 1828), in G. EDWARD
WHrTE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35, at 712-13 (1988) (vols. 3 and
4 in the History of the Supreme Court of the United States by the Oliver Wendell Holmes
Devise), cited in GETCHES ET AL., supra note 23, at 129.
28. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17 (emphasis supplied), cited in
GeTcHts Sr AL, supra note 23, at 130.
29. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), cited in GErcHts Er AtL, supra note 23, at 139.
30. GErcHs Er AL, supra note 23, at 146.
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of the Indian "beneficiaries." While the terms of this "trust" are vague, and
malleable according to the wishes of any particular court, the relationship is
commonly understood to impart a fiduciary duty for tribal resources and
property on the federal government. Consultations, then, can be roughly
understood as communication by Indian beneficiaries of their desires to the
federal trustees who make ultimate determinations about what happens with the
lands Indians occupy.
B. Origins of Consultations
It is not necessary to discover when the first consultation requirement was
promulgated to know that the concept of binding the federal government to
consult with tribes before the taking action is an old one?' In Peoria Tribe of
Indians of Oklahoma v. United States,32 the tribe contended that in 1857 that
the federal government violated its treaty rights through the below-value sale of
tribal land.3 One of the apparently uncontested clauses in that treaty reads:
"[li]t is agreed that the President may, from time to time, and in consultation
with said Indians, determine how much shall be invested in safe and profitable
stocks . . . ."' Discovering how many times the government has violated such
requirements would be perhaps an impossible task. However, the long series of
government betrayals and breaches of trust regarding Native Americans is well
documented. Two noted Indian law commentators write:
It is impossible to avoid the conclusion ... that the young nation's
ideals were often subservient to its ambitions when it came to
honoring solemn promises contained in the treaties. Breach by the
United States was common; in one case a treaty was respected for
only 12 days before it was violated by the government negotiator.?'
The policy of dealing with Indians on the basis of treaties, which had been
the practice since the first European colonizers arrived, was ended by statute in
1871 .' The federal government has since dealt with tribes through
congressional, executive, and judicial orders. One result is that tribes have had
to deal with the often dire consequences of several major turnabouts in federal
31. 1 make no attempt here to provide a thorough history of federal Indian law. While no
background in this subject is necessary, it is presumed that the interested reader will have some
fundamental understanding of the Indian law.
32. 390 U.S. 468 (1968).
33. ld. at 469-70.
34. Treaty with the Kaskaskia, Peoria, Etc., May 30, 1854, art. 7, 10 Stat. 1082, 1084
(emphasis supplied).
35. Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation:
"As Long as Water Flows or Grass Grows upon the Earth" - How Long a Time Is That?, 63
CAL. L. REV. 601, 611 (1975), quoted in GErCHES Er AL, supra note 23, at 156.
36. 25 U.S.C. § 71(1994); see also Faux S. COHEN's HANDBooK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
105, 107 (Rennard F. Strickland et a]. eds., 1982).
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Indian policy, many of which were accomplished without any significant input
from tribes.e The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA)," Termination
Period39 policies, and the Termination Period statute known as Public Law
280" each effected radical changes in policy and had correspondingly marked
effects on Indian life, and each took effect without any record of tribal
consultations." Public Law 280 was amended in 1968 to require that states
obtain tribal consent before any further expansion of state jurisdiction. It is
noteworthy that there has been no significant extension of Public Law 280
jurisdiction since that amendment took effect.4
President Nixon's 1970 message to Congress on Indian affairs is the
landmark beginning the "Self-Determination" era.43 Nixon asked Congress in
unambiguous terms to renounce Termination Period policies,; which Congress
did; and then in a series of statutes began the process of giving the tribes greater
control of tribal affairs.
37. See generally COHEN, supra note 36; GErcHEs ET AL., supra note 23; WILLIAM C.
CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL (1988).
38. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994); see also GETCHES ET AL, supra note 23, at 215 (citing
commentary on the IRA as having both positive and negative effects on Indian tribes),
39. Termination referred to the ending of the recognition of tribes by the federal government,
as part of an effort to assimilate Indians into the dominant society. See GETCHES ET AL., supra
note 23, at 229-49. The "Termination Period" began with numerous congressional actions in the
early 1940s and lasted until the political force behind it ebbed in the early 1960s. Id. at 251-52.
The threat created by termination policies are credited with helping to rally tribal leaders, who
in the summer of 1961 held the "largest multitribal meeting in decades" which in turn helped rally
state leaders and non-Indians against termination policies. STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF
THE NATIVE 123-24 (1988), quoted in GETcES Er AL., supra note 23, at 251-52. The Kennedy
administration took no action to terminate tribes, and Johnson's Great Society programs of the
mid-1960s embraced tribal interests. GErCHES Er AL., supra note 23, at 252. President Nixon's
1970 message to Congress is seen as the landmark for the beginning of the "self-determination"
em in federal Indian policy. Id.
40. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588. Public Law 280 shifted
jurisdictional power over Indian disputes away from the federal government and toward the states.
See CANBY, supra note 37, at 176-77 ("State governments resented the fact that they were given
the duty of law enforcement without the means to pay for it .... The tribes, on the other hand,
resented the fact that state jurisdiction was thrust upon them without their consent and they
particularly objected to the provision that additional states could acquire jurisdiction without even
consulting the concerned tribes.").
41. See generally GETcHEs ET AL., supra note 23, at 215-49.
42. See CANBY, supra note 37, at 177.
43. See President's Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, 213 PuB. PAPERS 564
(July 8, 1970); see also H.R. Doc. No. 91-363 (1970) (outlining tribal self-determination policy).
44. Nixon's message included the following:
Because termination is morally and legally unacceptable, because it produces bad
practical results, and because the mere threat of termination tends to discourage
greater self-sufficiency among Indian groups, I am asking the Congress to...
expressly renounce, repudiate and repeal the termination policy as expressed in
House Concurrent Resolution 108 of the 83rd Congress.
President's Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, supra note 43, at 567.
45. See GETCHES Er AL., supra note 23, at 254 n.1; Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie Martinis,
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President Reagan's Indian policy, announced in 1983, emphasized a
"government-to-government relationship" with tribes, a policy followed in turn
by both President Bush and President Clinton. On April 29, 1994, Clinton
announced his government-to-government policy with a memorandum that
included the following language:
Each executive department and agency shall consult, to the greatest
extent practicable, and to the extent permitted by law, with tribal
governments prior to taking actions that affect federally recognized
tribal governments. All such consultations are to be open and
candid so that all interested parties may evaluate for themselves the
potential impact of relevant proposals 7
Ironically, there is no indication that this policy was developed in consultation
with Indian tribes; rather, it was presented as a fait accompli at the April 29
summit of tribal leaders.
Pursuant to Clinton's memo, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt issued
Secretarial Order 3175, "Departmental Responsibilities for Indian Trust
Resources," which required DOI bureaus and offices to prepare policy guidelines
and explained the consultation clause thus:
Bureaus and offices [of the DOI] are required to consult with the
recognized tribal government with jurisdiction over the trust
property that the proposal may affect, the appropriate office of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Office of the Solicitor (for legal
assistance) if their evaluation reveals any impacts on Indian trust
resources. 4
The order disclaims the creation of any legal rights not already established by
law ' Disclaimers aside, the compilation of the policies from DOI's branches
is one source of authority regarding consultation requirements. Another result
has been an explosion in the number of federal regulations that include
consultation requirements: in 1996, only a handful of regulations had such
requirements, while today they are liberally sprinkled throughout the Code. °
Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1, 4-5 & nn.21-25 (1995).
46. See Judith V. Royster, Environmental Protection and Native American Rights:
Controlling Land Use Through Environmental Regulation, KAN. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y, Summer
1991, at 89, 93, 99 n.77 (vol. 1, no. 1).
47. President William J. Clinton, Government-to-Government Relations with Native
American Tribal Governments: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies (Apr. 29, 1994).
48. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Departmental Responsibilities for Indian Trust Resources (Nov.
8, 1993) (Secretarial Order No. 3175).
49. Id.
50. See supra note 3.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
Court cases in recent years have tested consultation language in statutes such
as the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), and the National Historic Preservation Act
(N-PA). The results of these cases have typically not been favorable to Indian
interests, with a few notable exceptions in the lower courts."'
C. Tension Between the Three Branches of Federal Government Regarding
Tribal Sovereignty and Consultation Issues
Indian law commentators observe that there is a tension between Congress
and the Supreme Court on issues of tribal sovereignty.' I argue that one effect
of this tension may be that federal-tribal consultation is important in a way that
it never has been before. If so, this newly assumed role for consultation as a
central element of federal-tribal relations, issues regarding consultation will
continue to become more contentious and divisive until some clear resolution
is reached.
1. The Supreme Court, the Federal Bench, and Tribal Sovereignty
a) The Court's Erosion of Tribal Sovereignty
Regarding the tension between Congress and the Supreme Court, one Indian
law commentator writes:
Indian nations today are faced with a critical dichotomy in their
treatment by the federal government. For the most part, Congress
has embarked on a path of promoting and encouraging economic
development and self-sufficiency, while the Supreme Court has
taken virtually every opportunity in recent years to undercut the
legal and practical basis of reservation self-government 3
Others observe that the Court, specifically as led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, has
returned to a policy long since abandoned by Congress, which they dub
"Rehnquist's New Judicial Termination Policy":
Although Congress has rejected the policy of termination, Rehnquist
and the Court seem to have adopted it. Chief Justice Rehnquist has
made it his policy to chip away at the sovereignty of Indian nations.
His policy contradicts not only the will of Congress, but also a long
line of Supreme Court decisions affirming inherent tribal
sovereignty.'
51. See infra Part IV for a selection of case briefs.
52. See Royster, supra note 46, at 89.
53. Id.
54. Johnson & Martinis, supra note 45, at 7.
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This may not be the only item on Rehnquist's agenda' Based on a survey of
seventy-nine cases involving Indian claims that Rehnquist has participated in,
the authors conclude:
First, when [Rehnquist] can find disestablishment or termination of
an Indian tribe or treaty right through federal legislation, even when
the legislation is murky or ambiguous, he will do so. Second, when
he can find a means of limiting tribal court jurisdiction, he will so
hold. Third, he has created new tests for determining the limits of
tribal courtjurisdiction, based on the tribes' dependent status and the
'unspoken assumption' of Congress. These phrases are so vague that
they establish no principled itandards. They give the Court carte
blanche to decide cases subjectively. Fourth, he believes that state
regulations and taxes should apply on reservations, especially to
non-Indians, unless federal legislation can be found expressing an
opposite intent. This position reverses a long-standing rule of
construction in Indian cases - that state law does not apply on a
reservation unless Congress clearly expresses that intent. Finally, he
attaches little importance to the long-standing rules of construing
treaties, agreements, and statutes in favor of Indian interests.... He
is, at least, consistent and predictable.'
The authors also note that Rehnquist has not joined a dissent in an Indian case
since 1989
But it would appear that Rehnquist is not alone in his apparent indifference
toward tribal sovereignty interests. The most startling evidence of this is in the
unanimous decision in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government
in which the Court, in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas, found that lands
reserved to Native Americans under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
did not quality as "Indian county."" The decision has had grave effects on
Alaskan tribes' jurisdiction and sovereignty, and repercussions will likely be felt
elsewhere in federal Indian law cases. In Venetie, as one commentator points
out, the Court apparently ignored long-standing canons of construction, which
require statutory interpretations that favor Indian interests: "[i]f the canons had
been applied, it appears likely the ultimate outcome of the decision would have
been different."' What is particularly remarkable about this development is
55. Id. at 25.
56. Id. at 24-25.
57. Id.
58. 522 U.S. 520, 523 (1998).
59. Id.
60. David M. Blurton, Canons of Construction, Stare Decisis and Dependent Indian
Communities: A Test of Judicial Integrity, 16 ALAsKA L. REv. 37, 59 (1999).
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that the unanimity of the decision seems to cut across political lines among the
justices:
It is difficult to believe all the justices were so politically opposed
to the Venetie Tribal Government's position that they would ignore
legal precedent that had been presented in a manner demanding
recognition. The unanimity of the Court suggests the justices did
not feel legally'constrained to apply the federal Indian law canons
of construction. '
Whether this development is an anomaly, or a determined change of course
remains to be seen. Given these trends, however, to say that the Court is
probably hostile to Indian interests in tribal sovereignty risks vast
understatement. This trend gives Native Americans and tribes a strong incentive
to stay out of federal court: "One can only hope that Rehnquist loses his
majority before his judicial agenda completely devastates tribal sovereignty."a
b) The Erosion of Procedural Safeguards
Recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that even if there are protective
procedural hoops to jump through - including consultations - ultimately
federal agencies are neither substantively or procedurally bound to those
procedures( Two Supreme Court cases that have a direct bearing on what
federal-tribal consultations might mean are Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlifie and
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n.'
Luja is remarkable for the Supreme Court's decision to ignore
congressionally created citizen standing provisions with regard to procedural
rights valid against action by the executive branch.' Additionally, it is relevant
to a discussion about consultation because the injury complained of in Lujan
was the DOI's refusal to hold consultations with the public before engaging a
project that would adversely effect endangered species abroad.' The decision
turns on an interpretation of what is required for standing. Scalia, for the
majority, writes:
This is not a case where plaintiffs are seeking to enforce a
procedural requirement the disregard of which could impair a
separate concrete interest of theirs (e.g., the procedural requirement
61. Id.
62. Johnson & Martinis, supra note 45, at 25.
63. Lower courts have ruled that consultations are nonbinding. See Hoopa Valley Tribe v.
Christie, 812 F.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1987); see infra Part IV.
64. 504 U.S. 555 (1987).
65. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
66. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-62; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION
64 (2nd ed. 1994).
67. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558-59.
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for hearing prior to denial of their license application, or the
procedural requirement for an environmental impact statement
before a federal facility is constructed next door to them) ....
Rather, the court held that the injury-in-fact requirement had been
satisfied by congressional conferral upon all persons of an abstract,
self-contained, noninstrumental 'right' to have the executive observe
the procedures required by law. We reject this view.u
Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, in dissent, note that whatever this might
mean, the Court "cannot be saying that 'procedural injuries' as a class" are
insufficient for purposes of article III standing:
Most governmental conduct can be classified as "procedural."...
Yet, these injuries are not categorically beyond the pale of redress
by the federal courts....
... [T]he principal effect of foreclosing judicial enforcement of
such procedures is to transfer power into the hands of the executive
at the expense - not of the courts - but of Congress, from which
that power originates and emanates!'
From the examples quoted in Scalia's opinion, it is possible that Lujan will not
affect tribal assertions of injury through federal disregard of consultation
requirements. However, Lujan clearly undermines the ability of citizens to
enforce congressionally granted procedural rights against the executive through
court action, an unsettling result given the already tenuous nature of consultation
requirements.
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, the Court, in an
opinion by Justice O'Connor, certified the federal governments ability to use
federal land in any manner it chooses, without regard to concurrent Native
American religious interestsm As long as the purpose of the federal action is
not specifically to burden any party's religious freedom, then the inadvertent
effect of destroying the practice of a certain religion is not prohibited by the
Constitution.7' Significantly, the majority found that it was unnecessary to
reach the compelling state interest test that had to this point been used by the
court to decide if a plaintiffs rights to free exercise of religion had been
violated?'
68. Id. at 572-73 (citations omitted).
69. Id. at 601-02 (Blackmun, I., dissenting).
70. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449.
71. See id.
72. See id. The compelling state interest test was again abandoned in another important
Indian freedom of religion case, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding an Oregon regulation prohibiting the use of peyote as applied
to its sacramental use by the Native American Church).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999
38 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24
[t]he Lyng Court never reached the "compelling governmental
interest" test... because the tribes did not prove to the majority
that the government's actions were sufficient to "prohibit" the free
exercise of their religion. Justice O'Connor said that "governmental
programs, which may make it more difficult to practice certain
religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into
acting contrary to their religious beliefs [do not] require government
to bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise lawful
actions. '
Justice Brennan, in dissent, called this result "cruelly surreal," and noted that in
effect, the Court was holding that to destroy a religion was not to burden it.74
Lyng provides a sense of how far the Court is willing to solidify federal rights
at the expense of Native American interests, which in turn overshadows all
discussions about the value of federal consultations with tribes.
c) Hostility Toward Tribal Sovereignty on the Federal Bench
Economic conservatism is traditionally hostile to restraints on land
development, and thus Indian land claimants have found few friends either in
Congress or the White House in recent years. Moreover, the predominance of
politically conservative appointees to the federal bench during the Reagan and
Bush years, combined with the failure of the Clinton administration to secure
Senate approval for scores of its appointees, has made taking federal cases that
much less attractive to tribes as a means of defending their interests.
2. Congress and Tribal Sovereignty
Meanwhile, perhaps in reaction to the high court's decisions (or perhaps in
reaction to the increased lobbying on the part of tribes that has resulted from
these decisions), or for other unrelated reasons, Congress has pursued a
countervailing trend buttressing tribal sovereignty that began in the early
1970s.7 One recent example is the passage of a bill that incorporated the
Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994 and the Indian Self-
Determination Contract Reform Act of 1994,76 signed into law in October
1994. The law makes dozens of changes that promote tribal control of tribal
73. GETCHES Er AL, supra note 23, at 748-49.
74. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 472.
75. The strength of this countervailing trend, however, is subject to debate. Claudeen Bates
Arthur, director of litigation at DNA People's Legal Services, Inc., and former Navajo Nation
Attorney General, feels such talk is "more rhetoric than reality. Laws without money to carry out
the responsibilities leave tribes with nothing but rhetoric." Interview with Claudeen Bates Arthur
(Oct. 27, 1999).
76. Pub. L. No. 102-413, 108 Stat. 4259 (specifying the terms of Self-Determination Act
contracts, making permanent the Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project, and providing
for the addition of new tribes to the program).
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affairs?9 Among these are responsibilities assigned to the Secretary of the
Interior that include consultation requirements.' Another example is in the area
of environmental regulations:
For the past decade, Congress and the Environmental Protection
Agency have been promoting and strengthening the tribal role in
environmental regulation of Indian territories. Each of the major
federal pollution control acts that has come up for reauthorization
has been amended to include provisions that treat Indian tribes as
states for environmental protection purposes. . . . The Supreme
Court, on the other hand, has hobbled the ability of many Indian
nations to take full control over environmental affairs in their
territories. 9
It may be that tribal sovereignty will continue to expand through this
promulgation of statutes that serve tribal interests well. However, the Supreme
Court has continued to limit tribal sovereignty. Meanwhile, Congress has yet
thoroughly to discuss what it means to do in creating consultation procedures.'
3. The Executive Branch and Tribal Sovereignty
As this conflict between Congress and Court continues, the Clinton
administration has formulated its own Indian policy. President Clinton has led
tribal leaders to believe that he is a supporter of tribal sovereignty interests, and
tribal leaders have expressed their willingness to hold him to his word.8 On
April 29, 1994, Clinton, who is the first president in history to invite leaders
from all 547 recognized tribes to meet and develop federal Indian policy,"
signed a directive that requires all federal agencies and departments to:
consult, to the greatest extent practicable and to the extent permitted
by law, with tribal governments prior to taking actions that affect
federally recognized tribal governments. All such consultations are
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. Royster, supra note 46, at 89 (citing Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989) (holding that significant non-Indian ownership of
Indian territory undermines Indian authority to zone the non-Indian lands)).
80. Various Westlaw database searches of legislative history reveal no discussions
concerning the meaning of consultation.
81. Mary Christina Wood, Fulfilling the Executive's Trust Responsibility Toward the Native
Nations on Environmental Issues: A Partial Critique of the Clinton Administration's Promises
and Performance, 25 ENVTL. L. 733, 800 n.4 (1995) (citing Keith White, Mankiller CalLv Clinton
Meeting an Act of Faith, Gannett News Service, Apr. 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Arcnws File (stating that many tribal leaders who attended Clinton's tribal summit would
hold him accountable for promises made)).
82. Id. at 734-35.
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to be open and candid so that all interested parties may evaluate for
themselves the potential impact of relevant proposals."
The memorandum also directed federal agents to "undertake activities.., in a
knowledgeable, sensitive manner respectful of tribal sovereignty."'" Ironically,
there is no evidence that the memo was itself the product of consultation.
One direct result of the memo was the issuance by Interior Secretary Bruce
Babbitt of Order 3175, "Departmental Responsibilities for Indian Trust
Resources." The order reiterated the goals of the Presidential memo, and
required the heads of Department of the Interior (DOI) bureaus and offices to
"prepare and publish procedures and directives prior to the expiration of this
Order" to ensure awareness of and compliance with the memo.' Of the
eleven policies submitted to the Office of American Indian Trust, all of them
rely to greater or lesser extent on the concept of consultation with the tribes."
Federal agencies have also been busy drafting new consultation requirements
for the Code of Federal Regulations. A search of the 1996 version of the Code
revealed only a handful of such requirement clauses. In 1997, well over 150
individual consultation-invoking clauses can be found.'
D. The Uncertain Centerpiece of Federal Tribal Relations
While the Indian policies of Congress and the executive branch seem to be
roughly in accord and opposed to the Supreme Court's apparent agenda, this
conflict puts consultations in the middle of the controversy. Because the
Supreme Court and the conservative bench have made federal court challenges
such an unsavory prospect, and because the President and the Congress created
a forum for participation not otherwise available, consultations would seem to
offer a means for tribes to participate in federal decision-making, while the
atmosphere of federal courts provide the incentive to avoid judicial involvement.
Tribal leaders willing to participate in consultations are nevertheless faced
with uncertainty that their participation is meaningful. This uncertainty alone,
however, is not enough to dissuade tribes from working to take advantage of
every opportunity available to them to increase their influence over the policies
and decisions that affect them. Despite their successes lobbying and garnering
83. Clinton, supra note 47.
84. Jd
85. The order expired October 1, 1994. As of this writing, draft copies of each branch's
policy had only just been compiled for review by the Office of American Indian Trust.
86. U.S. Dept of the Interior, Departmental Responsibilities for Indian Trust Resources (Nov.
8, 1993) (Sicretarial Order No. 3147) (stating the intent that "each bureau and office will operate
within a government to govemment relationship with federally recognized Indian tribes .... ).
87. Set? U.S. DEPr OF THE INTERIOR, PROTECTION OF INDIAN TRUST RESOURCES
PROCEDURES MANUAL (1996) [hereinafter INTERIOR DEP'r PROCEDURES MANUAL] (on file vith
the author) (also available from Office of American Indian Trust, U.S. Department of the Interior,
1849 C Street, N.W., MS-2472-MIB, Washington, D.C. 20240, (202) 208-3338)).
88. See supra note 3.
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political support for a limited range of issues in recent decades, Native
Americans remain a largely disenfranchised minority. Although the
pervasiveness of consultation requirements underscores the importance of
finding a consistent practical use of the term, agencies have been given free
reign to create individualized policies, not necessarily - and from the available
evidence, usually not - in consultation with tribes. This opens consultations to
the potential for bureaucratic abuse and breach of faith. While other options are
reduced, consultation is increasingly at the core of federal/tribal participation
policies, ambiguities in and among various consultation requirements create
confusion at the same time that tribal entities seek reliable means of influencing
federal actions in a meaningful way.
IV. Consultation Case Law
While no statistically significant picture can be drawn from the few reported
consultation cases, I have provided capsule sketches of fourteen prominent cases
that provide useful insight into the difficulties with consultation requirements.
It is my intent that this brief survey may provide guidance to the practitioner -
or legislator - who requires an understanding of the nature of consultation in
the context of litigation. In some cases, I have provided commentary on the
potential implications on the discussion of consultation. I have also indicated the
source of the consultation requirement, or the source of the claim that a
consultation requirement exists.
A. Federal Tribal Consultation Case Law
1. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus'
and the Ninth Circuit's Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Christie9 decision are perhaps
the two seminal opinions on consultation, particularly consultation as required
by an agency's policies. The dispute in Oglala Sioux arose when the BIA
transferred its Pine Ridge, South Dakota superintendent, Anthony Whirlwind
Horse, to the DOI office in Aberdeen, South Dakota, without first consulting the
tribe." The superintendent was himself an Oglala Sioux, the first BIA
superintendent in the area to speak Lakota, and his continued tenure was
enthusiastically endorsed by the tribal council on many occasions.' The BIA
chose to transfer Anthony after his brother, Elijah Whirlwind Horse, was elected
tribal president, because Elijah's election supposedly created a prohibited conflict
89. 603 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1979).
90. 812 F.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1987).
91. IU at 710.
92. d. at 709.
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of interest under Interior Department guidelines with regard to his brother's BIA
position 3
Immediately following Elijah's election, rumors circulated that the BIA was
considering transferring Anthony Whirlwind Horse." After the transfer
decision had been made, but before the decision was announced, the BIA
welcomed to its Washington, D.C. offices two representatives from the Oglala
Sioux Tribe, who argued against any possible transfer of Anthony Whirlwind
Horse.95 Following that meeting and the announcement of the transfer, BIA
Assistant Secretary Forrest Gerard agreed to reconsider the decision, but
subsequently decided to proceed with the transfer." At trial, the government
argued the meeting constituted adequate consultation, but the court rejected
this contention, saying,
By the time that the ... audience was granted, the decision to
remove Anthony Whirlwind Horse had already been made.
"Permitting the submission of views after (an administrative
deision has been made) is no substitute for the right of interested
persons to make their views known to the agency in time to
influence the (administrative) process in a meaningful way" ...
Although Gerard agreed to reconsider the Bureau's decision, it
appears that this reconsideration . . . did not involve a
reconsideration of the wisdom of the application of the Interior
Department's conflict-of-interest policy to Indian employees of the
BIA. 7
The tribe, with Anthony Whirlwind Horse as an intervening plaintiff, sued
the government for violations of the provisions of a BIA consultation
policy,' for violation of the letter and spirit of the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act)," the IRA, " and on the grounds that the
decision was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion as set forth in the
APA.'10
The court agreed that the BIA decision violated the IRA, and consequently
the APA., and that the action "was procedurally defective in that it was not
93. Id at 710 (citing 43 C.F.R. § 20.735-32(d)).
94. id.
95. Id
96. I at 711.
97. i at 720 (citation omitted) (quoting City of New York v. Diamond, 279 F. Supp. 503,
517 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)).
98. Id. at 711 (citing Guidelines for Consultation with Tribal Groups on Personnel
Management Within the Bureau of Indian Affairs (May 5, 1972)).
99. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1994).
100. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994).
101. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994), cited in Oglala Sioux, 603 F.2d at 710.
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made in accordance with the Bureau's own procedure requiring prior
consultation with the Tribe.""' The court summarized its holding thus:
[W]here the Bureau [of Indian Affairs] has established a policy
requiring prior consultation with a tribe, and has thereby created
a justified expectation on the part of the Indian people that they
will be given a meaningful opportunity to express their views
before Bureau policy is made, that opportunity must be afforded.
Failure of the Bureau to make any real attempt to comply with its
own policy of consultation not only violates those general
principles which govern administrative decisionmaking, but also
violates "the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the
Government in its dealings with these dependent and sometimes
exploited people.""'
Notably, the government did not argue that the Bureau was "not bound by
the consultation guidelines, or that the guidelines [were] not enforceable by
the affected tribes or by the members of the tribes," and instead argued only
that the particular guidelines did not apply."0' The court said the action
violated "the letter and the spirit of the Bureau's consultation guidelines.""5
2. Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Christie
Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Christie" is the Ninth Circuit counterpoint to
Oglala Sioux. The Hoopas argued that an unratified 1864 treaty, which
established the Hoopa reservation, also created a property right in the
assignment of a federal agent to live on the reservation for the benefit of the
tribe." The court rejected that contention, on the grounds that the United
States was not bound to the unratified treaty, and because none of the tribes
other claims succeeded in demonstrating the creation of a property right."
The court found no violation of the federal trust responsibility, and no
violation of the APA."' The court further rejected the district court's
acknowledgment of a tribal right to consultation, following Oglala Sioux:
The "Guidelines for Consultation with Tribal Groups on Personnel
Management within the Bureau of Indian Affairs" are not
102. Oglata Sioux, 603 F.2d at 714.
103. Id. at 721 (citations omitted) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236 (1974),
quoting in turn Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942)).
104. 1l at 718. Trial testimony by Assistant Secretary Gerard disposed of that argument.
See id. at 719.
105. Id. at 718-19.
106. 812 F.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1986).
107. Id. at 1099.
108. Id at 1102-03.
109. Id
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conceded by the.Bureau to have the force of law, in contrast to
the governmental concession made in Oglala Sioux Tribe v.
Andrus. Nor are these Guidelines the same as regulations that
must be applied because "the rights of individuals are affected."
The Guidelines are in letter form and are unpublished. They call
for consultation where major moves affect the Indians. They give
direction to the Bureau. They do not establish legal standards that
can be enforced against the Bureau."'
The court then found that even if the Guidelines had binding effect, the BIA
had substantially complied, and gave this definition of consultation:
"Consultation is not the same as obeying those who are consulted. The Hupas
were heard, even though their advice was not accepted.""'
3. Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. Deer
Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. Deer" is a 1995 update that also builds on
the 1979 Oglala Sioux decision. Again the BIA had made an unpopular
personnel management decision, again without consulting the tribe as required
by the policies set forth in the BIA's consultation manual.'" The sole issue
in this case is the consultation issue. The case contains a rare definition of
"meaningful consultation," in the introduction:
consultation comprised a one to two hour meeting, not more than
one half day, during which meeting the superintendent notifies the
Council of the BIA's proposed action, justifying his reasoning.
The Tribal Council may either issue a motion or resolution of
support for the decision, or reject the decision. The tribe
recognizes that the BIA need not obey the Council's decision.
Meaningful consultation means tribal consultation in advance with
the decision maker or with intermediaries with clear authority to
present tribal views to the BIA decision maker. The decision
maker is to comply with BIA and administration policies."4
The case is also valuable for its language regarding holding the BIA to its
consultation policies:
The BIA now contends the guidelines and policies do not have
the force of law and thus create no duty upon the BIA which
would support the tribe's complaint .... The BIA is not to be
110. d. at 1103 (citations omitted).
111. d.
112. 911 F. Supp. 395 (D.S.D. 1995).
113. d. at 398-401.
114. Id. at 401 (citing Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Christie, 812 F.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1987))
(citation omitted) (emphasis supplied).
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permitted to disavow its own policies and directives. The BIA
could easily at any time have narrowed or eliminated guidelines,
memorandums, directives, policies and promises of meaningful
consultation. They did not do so, even after Oglala was decided.
The guidelines and policies clearly embody the policy of the
BIA. ...'"
The court reviewed a BIA memo that discussed the "precarious position"
involved in moving forward on the decision without consulting the tribes:
"This court agrees. It was a precarious position. It was also in violation of
tribal rights."
' 6
The court examined the tribe's contention that a presidential memorandum
created enforceable consultation rights, and concluded the memo "does not,
however, create any enforceable duty .... The memorandum is, however,
further evidence of BIA policy, the interpretation of BIA policy by the BIA
and by the federal government and the tribe's reliance thereon."".
Finally, the court noted that "[t]he BIA is unlike any other agency,
however, and . . . reducing the number of employees may not be
accomplished without meaningful prior consultation with the tribes."".
4. Morton v. Ruiz
Morton v. Ruiz"' is typically cited for the proposition that the federal
trust responsibility extends to Indians in Native American communities
beyond reservation borders. In Morton v. Ruiz, the Supreme Court decided
that a husband and wife, who were members of the Papago Indian tribe but
who lived off the reservation, were entitled to apply for general assistance
under the Snyder Act.m The Court found no indication that Congress
intended the BIA to withhold assistance from full-blooded Indian tribal
members who had significant economic and social ties with the
reservation.'2'
In Morton v. Ruiz, the BIA did not publish the eligibility requirements for
the general assistance applied for by the plaintiffs.'" Because the BIA's own
Manual required the bureau to publish all directives that "inform the public
of privileges and benefits available" and of "eligibility requirements," the
115. lit at 400.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 401.
118. Id.
119. 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
120. Id. at 199.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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Court found the BIA in substantial noncompliance with its own
regulations:
No matter how rational or consistent with congressional intent a
particular decision might be, the determination of eligibility
cannot be made on an ad hoc basis by the dispenser of the funds.
The Administrative Procedure Act was adopted to provide,
inter alia, that administrative policies affecting individual rights
and obligation be promulgated pursuant to certain stated
procedures so as to avoid the inherently arbitrary nature of
unpublished ad hoc decisions ....
Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent
upon agencies to follow their own procedures. This is so even
where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than
otherwise would be required."
The reasoning of Morton v. Ruiz does not deal with consultation, however
the case may be relevant to consultation issues in light of this language about
the promulgation and administration of federal agency policies. Perhaps the
bulk of the consultations engaged in the field are done pursuant to
unpublished, "internal" policies and procedures, similar to those cited in
Oglala Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux. It may be expected that future cases
will argue that consultation policies confer a benefit to the tribes according to
the principles in Morton v. Ruiz.
5. Native Americans for Enola v. United States Forest Service
In Native Americans for Enola v. United States Forest Service,'"
plaintiffs charged the United States Forest Service (the Forest Service) with
a violation of the NHPA pursuant to a decision to allow a logging company
to haul logs on certain roads in Mt. Hood National Forest." The central
issue was whether the Forest Service's decision was "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," according to the
APA. 12
7
The relevant discussion on consultation arose with respect to 36 C.F.R. §§
800.4(b), (c) and (d), which require federal agency officials, inter alia, to
work to identify and evaluate any cultural resources on the property "[iun
consultation with the State Historic Preservation Officer."'' The court found
123. ILd. at 235.
124. Ld. at 233-35.
125. 832 F. Supp. 297 (D. Or. 1993).
126. d. at 298.
127. 5 U.S.C. §§ 704-706 (1994).
128. Protection of Historic and Cultural Properties, Subpart B: The Section 106 Process, 36
C.F.R. § 800.4A(b)-(d) (1996).
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that the Forest Service had conducted "several field inventories seeking sites
traditionally used by Native Americans," and sought comments from a
committee comprised of archaeologists, "an American Indian Liaison," a
Forest Service cultural resource technician, and attorneys.I Neither the field
inventories nor the committee found traditional cultural properties in the
studied area.'" The court concluded that these efforts "satisf[ied] the
'consultation' requirement set out in 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(b)," and further
concluded that in the absence of any evidence of cultural resources, as in this
case, the federal agent need only provide documentation of that finding,
pursuant to 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(d).13 1
6. Pueblo of Sandia v. United States
In Pueblo of Sandia v. United States,'31 the Pueblo of Sandia alleged the
Forest Service failed to comply with the NHPA 33 in evaluating the Las
Heurtas Canyon in the Cibola National Forest." The Forest Service
concluded the area had no traditional cultural property, and subsequently
instituted a new management strategy for the area.35 The bulk of the
opinion examined the facts to answer whether the Forest Service's activities
constituted (1) "reasonable effort," and (2) "good faith effort" pursuant to 36
C.F.R. § 800.4." The court concluded the that the Forest Service failed
both these tests.
The portion of the opinion that deals with consultation is found under the
"Good Faith Effort" subheading, wherein the court recognized that
consultation with the State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) was an
integral and required part of the NHPA section 106 process. 3 The court
found that the Forest Service had withheld information that was to prove
crucial to the SHPO's decision," and framed "consultation" thus "[a]ffording
129. Enola, 832 F. Supp. at 300.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 50 F.3d 856 (10th Cir. 1995).
133. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470mm (1994).
134. Pueblo of Sandia, 50 F.3d at 857. Plaintiffs had originally alleged that the Forest
Service's Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) violated the National Environmental
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1994), the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§
1600-1614 (1994), the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994), the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994), and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 701-706 (1994). However, plaintiffs abandoned all but the NHPA claim on appeal, and the
district court granted summary judgment for defendants on the NEPA and APA claims, which
the plaintiffs did not appeal. Pueblo of Sandia, 50 F.3d at 858 n.1.
135. Pueblo of Sandia, 50 F.3d at 856.
136. Id. at 859-62.
137. Id. at 862 (citing Attakai v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 1395, 1407 (D. Ariz. 1990)).
138. Id. (quoting the SHPO's statement that "our not having received [the relevant
documents] has affected our ability to consult appropriately under Section 106 of the [NHPA]").
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the SHPO an opportunity to offer input on potential historic properties would
be meaningless unless the SIPO has access to available, relevant information.
Thus, 'consultation' with the SHPO mandates an informed consultation.' 39
There is arguably an implicit meaning of consultation found in the courts
words. If consultations with an uninformed participant are meaningless, and
if "'consultation' ... mandates an informed consultation,"'" then one of the
requirements for meaningful consultations may be that the consulted
interlocutor be informed.
The Pueblo of Sandia case is especially interesting for its exposure of the
Forest Service's delaying tactics, 4' disregard of tribal concerns,'42 and bald
mendacity.'43 Finally, it seems the Forest Service preferred in this instance
to deal with an ignorant interlocutor - whose opinions it could ignore as
meaningless - than to take seriously the implications of an informed
consultant.'"
7. Attakai v. United States
The Attakai v. United States' litigation arose from one battle in the
ongoing Navajo-Hopi land dispute.'" In this case, the dispute arose over the
construction of a fence and livestock watering facilities near the home of
Navajos still living on Hopi partition land.'47 The plaintiff Navajos alleged,
inter alia, that the construction violated their free exercise rights, and that the
project was executed in violation of the consultation requirements of NHPA
section 106.'"
The facts show that field surveys, including "walkover[s]" of the sites,
were done by the BIA, but that the "no effect" reports were never sent to the
139. Id. at 862.
140. Id.
141. "The Forest Service did not provide the SHPO copies of the Lauriano and Brandt
affidavit; [which suggested, inter alia, that the Forest Service's plan would cause traditional tribal
uses to be "significantly impaired if not totally destroyed," id. at 860] until after the consultation
was complete and the SHPO had concurred." Id. at 862.
142. "'Mhe Forest Service does not appear to have taken the requirements of [the NHPA]
very seriously.'" Id. at 862 (quoting the district court order).
143. "In fact [contrary to evidence and tribal communications the Forest Service was aware
of] the Forest Service informed the SHPO during consultation that '[c]onsultations with the pueblo
officials and elders, and other users of the Las Huertas Canyon area, disclosed no evidence that
the. . . area contains traditional cultural properties.'" Id.
144. This argument is developed further at infra Part VI.
145. 746 F. Supp. 1395 (D. Ariz. 1990).
146. See Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ariz. 1962), a J'dpercuriam, 373 U.S. 758
(1962) (holding that Navajo and Hopi tribes shared equal interest in reservation land lying outside
of the boundaries of the land Management district); Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation
Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-305, 94 Stat. 929 (providing for the relocation of Hopi
and Navajo tribal members living on land partitioned to the other tribe).
147. Attakai, 746 F. Supp. at 1399.
148. Id. at 1398.
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Arizona SHPO. 14' The court found that no consultations of any manner were
performed.'-' The defendants argued that the consultations are required to
determine the need for a survey, and since they performed surveys, they were
in compliance."' The court disagreed: "Without consultation with the SHPO
or reference to other available information, the Agency Official has no
reasonable basis under the regulations to determine what additional
investigation aside from a survey may be warranted.""
Although the court held that the regulations "clearly require consultation
with the SHPO," the language "or reference to other available information"
seems to open the possibility of side-stepping this requirement.'53
Nevertheless, the court ruled for the plaintiffs on this point, and noted that the
BIA's procedures were "contrary to the letter and spirit of the regulations,
which rely on consultation, particularly with the SHPO, as the principal means
of protecting historical resources."'' "
Plaintiffs further contended that the section 106 process required
consultation not only with the SHPO, but also with Navajo "cultural leaders,"
or the plaintiffs themselves.'55 Under the NHPA, "[w]hen an undertaking
will affect Indian lands, the Agency Official shall invite the governing body
of the responsible tribe to be a consulting party and to concur in any agree-
ment... .'"' The court first found that the regulations "clearly require that
an Indian Tribe participate as a consulting party and that it must concur in any
agreement regarding undertakings which affect its lands.""'
The next question the court addressed was which tribe, the plaintiff
Navajos or the defendant Hopis, would suffice for that consultation.' 1 The
court had earlier noted that section 106 makes a distinction between
consulting parties and interested persons.'" The consulting parties include
the Agency Official, the SHPO, and the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation." Interested persons are those parties who are concerned with
the effects of a project, and may include local governments and Indian tribes;
further, "[c]ertain portions of the regulations require that interested persons be
invited to be consulting parties, while the Agency Official, SHPO and Council
149. Id. at 1407.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. (emphasis supplied).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1408.
155. Id.




160. Id. (citing Protection of Historic and Cultural Properties, 36 C.F.R. § 800.1(c)(1),
(c)(2)).
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may agree to invite others to become consulting parties where it will advance
the objectives of section 106. "16t The court decided that the Navajos had a
right to participate, but the decision was unclear as to what that right
consisted of:
The regulations clearly contemplate participation by Indian tribes
regarding properties beyond their reservations .... Navajos still
reside in the areas affected by these projects awaiting relocation.
Under these circumstances, it is clear that input from the Navajo
tribe would advance the objectives of section 106. Accordingly,
I find that the regulations require that the Navajo tribe be
afforded the opportunity to participate as interested persons. This
conclusion does not extend to consultation with the plaintiffs, as
interested persons or otherwise, or other individual members of
the Navajo tribe. This conclusion does not infringe on the right
of the Hopi tribe to develop or use its lands, as the Navajo Tribe
is not entitled to be a consulting party or to concur in any
agreement. It merely assures, as the regulations contemplate, that
decisions regarding historic properties will be made upon
reasonably adequate information."
Presumably this means that the Navajos should have had the opportunity to
offer information if the Hopis chose to ask them. What is mysterious about
this decision is how the Hopis could have violated the Navajos' right to
participate as an interested party, if that status does not even confer a
consultation right. Nevertheless, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction based on violations of NHPA
8. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Rhoades
In Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Rhoades,"4 plaintiff Lewis LaPaz, a tribal
member, was employed by federal Indian Health Services (IHS). Once elected
to tribal council, his employer claimed a conflict of interest, and told LaPaz
he had the choice of resigning from the council, or resigning from his job
with IHS. LaPaz and the tribe, after having exhausted administrative
remedies, sued the government for violation of the IRA" and the Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act" by applying general
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1408-09 (emphasis supplied).
163. Id. at 1409.
164. 804 F. Supp. 251 (D.N.M. 1992). The case was first heard by the court in Mescalaro
Apache Tribe v. Rhodes, 755 F. Supp. 1484 (D.N.M. 1990).
165. Id. at 253 (citing Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994)).
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conflict of interest regulations to LaPaz's political activities, in violation of the
APA167
The court found that the case turned on whether it was appropriate to apply
Health and Human Services civil service standards of conduct without
involving the Tribe.' The court noted both the deference required of the
court toward the agency's interpretation of its own regulations, as well the
principle that statutes regarding Indians must be construed liberally in favor
of the Indians.' Further, it noted both the stated policy and legislative
intent of the ISDA, and the federal government's continuing commitment to
the unique trust relationship, and concluded that "[a] unilateral ultimatum that
directly impinges on tribal members' expression of electoral will must be
preceded by meaningful consultation."'70
The court found that although the IHS had no prior policy of consultation,
the ISDA "'created a justified expectation on the part of the Indian people that
they will be given a meaningful opportunity to express their views' before the
agency makes its decision."''M The court cited Oglala Sioux for the
proposition that failure to consult violated the federal government's trust
responsibility to tribes."
The court provided two options that "would constitute meaningful
consultation with the Tribe, under the Self-Determination Act."'" First, if
the defendants wanted to continue to apply the same standards,
defendants must afford tribal input, by formally soliciting the
Tribe's view of the purported conflict and of the appropriateness
of any proposed agency action. After the Tribe has had an
opportunity to express its views, the agency shall then consider
the views expressed. The agency does not have to defer to the
Tribe's views, but must take them into account in coming to a
decision consistent with applicable law.
This alternative would require tribal input in every instance of an agency
action that involved application of the disputed standards. 75 The other
alternative would be to promulgate a new rule, requiring tribal input during
167. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 704-706 (1994)).
168. Id. at 260-61.
169. Id. at 261.
170. Id.
171. Id at 261-62 (quoting Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707,721 (8th
Cir. 1979)).
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the promulgation phase, but not requiring consultations upon its subsequent
application. 76
9. Wilson v. Block
Wilson v. Block"7 stands for the proposition that the AIRFA does not
create a specific fiduciary relationship or the obligations imposed by such a
fiduciary relationship. "AIRFA requires federal agencies to evaluate their
policies and procedures.., and to consult with Indian organizations in regard
to the proposed action, but that AIRFA does not require Native traditional
religious considerations always [to] prevail to the exclusion of all else.'M7
This underscores the problem with all consultations: it is not necessary for the
government to heed Indian wishes.
10. United States v. Means
The court in United States v. Means"' held that the Forest Service's
failure to consult meaningfully with Indian religious leaders regarding a
special use permit for the Black Hills conflicted with AIRFA, and that the
denial of the permit was arbitrary and capricious."
11. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton
The decision in Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton,"'
discussed at greater length in Part VII.A., focused on an Interior Department
decision that the court held failed to take the federal trust responsibility into
adequate consideration." Faced with a decision concerning how water from
the Truckee River should be allocated between Indian and non-Indian
interests, the DOI made what was described in testimony as a "judgment
call:W83
A ' judgment call" was simply not legally permissible....
S. . t]he Secretary was required to resolve the conflicting
claims in a precise manner that would indicate the weight given
each interest before him .... The Secretary's action is therefore
doubly defective and irrational because it fails to demonstrate an
176. Id.
177. 708 F.2d 735, 745-47, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
178. Id. (quoting Havasupai v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471 (1990)) (emphasis supplied).
179. 627 F. Supp. 247 (1985).
180. Id at 266-69.
181. 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.C.C.) (mem.), modified, 360 F. Supp 669 (D.D.C 1973), rev'd in
part, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975).
182. Id. at 255-58.
183. Id. at 255, 256.
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adequate recognition of his fiduciary duty to the Tribe. This also
is an abuse of discretion and not in accordance with the law.i
The idea that the federal government's trust responsibility to the
tribe must inform federal agency decisions may be relevant to
consultation issues, in that consultations may be a bookmark for
places where the trust responsibility must be taken into
consideration.
B. Non-Indian Consultation Case Law
1. Washington State Department of Fisheries v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
The court in Washington State Department of Fisheries v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission" dealt with a non-tribal consultation requirement,
which may be informative as to the latitude of consultation claims. Washington
State Department of Fisheries (the Department) sued the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) for, inter alia, failing to consult with the
Commission and other regulatory agencies, pursuant to a consultation provision
in the Fish and Wildlife Act, when FERC issued hydroelectric permits for the
Snohomish River Basin.1M
The consultation issue was the only one brought on appeal.' The
Department argued that not only did FERC fall to consult with the required
parties, but also that "issuing permits on a case-by-case basis without first
developing a comprehensive plan imposing uniform study guidelines, or
requiring permittees to gather data useful for measuring cumulative impacts,
made it impossible as a practical matter to conduct the consultations
contemplated by the statute.""u The court agreed that there was no evidence
that FERC had done any consultations, but rejected the Department's argument
184. Id. at 256-57.
185. 801 F.2d 1516 (9th Cir. 1986). This case was heard and decided another case that
involved the issuance by FERC of hydroelectric permits without consultation on the Salmon
River. See National Wildlife Federation v. FERC, 801 F.2d 1505 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that
FERC did not justify foregoing preliminary studies and consultations before approving
preliminary permits for hydroelectric power projects).
186. Washington State Dep't of Fisherie, 801 F.2d at 1518 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 662, which
provides, in relevant part "whenever the waters of any stream or other body of water are proposed
or authorized to be impounded, diverted ... or modified for any purpose whatever ... by any
department or agency of the United States, or by any public or private agency under Federal
permit or license, such department or agency shallfirst consult with the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, and with the head of the agency exercising
administration over the wildlife resources of the particular State. . . ." (emphasis supplied)).
187. 1&. at 1519.
188. 1d.
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for the creation of standards to guide consultations.' Defendant FERC was
ordered to "consider and respond to petitioner's contentions."'"
2. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission"' is similar to Washington State Department
of Fisheries in that FERC again disregarded a non-tribal consultation
requirement, this time by relicensing a hydropower project." In this case, the
requirement was codified among FERC's own regulations, pertaining to exhibits
the applicant must provide before licensing: "The Applicant shall prepare this
exhibit on the basis of studies made after consultation and in cooperation with
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service [among other agencies] ... The exhibit shall
include a statement on the nature and extent of Applicant's consultation and
cooperation with the above agencies.""' FERC argued that the exhibit was the
type of filing requirement that an "agency may relax, modify or waive."" The
court disagreed, reiterating the maxim that agencies must comply with their own
regulations." Further.
It is not enough that the FERC gave notice of Chelan's application
to the agencies and Indian tribes. The consultation obligation is an
affirmative duty. Also, it is safe to say that the respective fishery
agencies believed the consultation process would take place in the
preparation of Exhibit S. Instead, however, FERC issued the license
before the exhibit was submitted."
The court concluded that consultation was the "primary means" for FERC to
comply with fisheries' examination requirements, and that the failure to consult
supported the court's decision to reverse and remand FERC's relicensing
order."
C. Case Law Holdings Summarized
Unfortunately, the small number of cases, and the fact that these cases are
substantially fact-driven, means that no statistically significant conclusions can
be drawn from this sample. Nevertheless, the case law at least tends to show
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 746 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1984).
192. Id. at 473.
193. Id. at 474 (citing 18 C.F.R. § 4.41 (1976)).
194. Id.
195. Id. (citing Papago Tribal Utility Auth. v. FERC, 628 F.2d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1091 (1980)).
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the tentative and slippery nature of consultation requirements: courts are split
on whether or not they exist and split again as to whether those found have
been violated or not. For reference purposes, the cases may be broken into
several categories.
First, there are the cases where a federal agency's internal policy guidelines
refer to consultations (Oglala Sioux, Hoopa Valley, Lower Brule Sioux, Morton
v. Ruiz). Of these four cases, three courts held that the unpublished policies
bound the agency to consultations (the Hoopa Valley court found the policy to
be nonbinding).
Second, there are the cases where the complainant tribe argued that a statute
required consultations (Enola, Pueblo of Sandia, Attakai, Havasupai, Means).
Of the three complainants that argued a failure of consultations required by
NHPA, two courts (Pueblo of Sandia and Attakat) found that the federal agency
had failed those requirements. One of the two courts found that the requirement
had been breached where it was argued that consultations failed as required by
AIRFA (Means; the Havasupai court found no AIRFA consultation duty on
non-Indian lands).
The Pyramid Lake Paiute case is salient for its holding that the federal trust
responsibility requires agencies do something more than simply make a
'judgment call" when dealing with Indian trust assets.
Finally, the non-Indian consultation cases show that consultation issues at
least are viable in other contexts, which is important to the extent that Indian
consultation requirements might need support in litigation.
V. Discussion: Agencies, Consultations, and Anti-Indian Bias
Consultations are the almost exclusive realm of federal executive agencies
and bureaus, and predominantly offices of the DOI. This section introduces
some of the problems to which agency decisions are susceptible with regard to
Native American issues, both with reference to consultations and otherwise. I
suggest that anti-Indian bias is inherent in some federal agency mechanisms and
that in others, abuses are predictable.
A. Conflicts of Interest
Perhaps it is axiomatic to note that Native Americans' interests do not
necessarily coincide with those of the federal government - this could be said
of any group of Americans. But importantly, the federal government has a
special role with respect to tribes. What is known as the federal trust
relationship with tribes makes the federal government the trustee of all tribally
held land. As a result, a divergence of interest between tribes and the federal
government gives rise to what in other contexts would be a conflict of interest:
the federal government must make impartial decisions regarding interests for
which, as trustee, it must also be the zealous defender. That conflict can be
found wherever the federal government makes a decision that affects Indian
interests in combination with the interests of any branch of the federal
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government, states or other third parties. Federal agencies are required on a
daily basis to fulfill responsibilities corresponding to legislative, judicial, and
executory functions. Those potentially conflicting roles create special problems
regarding fairness where federal-tribal consultations are concerned.
An example of such a conflict is found in the facts of Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe v. Morton." The court in Pyramid Lake Paiute focused on an Interior
Department decision that the court held failed to take the federal trust
responsibility into adequate consideration."w Faced with a decision concerning
how water from the Truckee River should be allocated between Indian and non-
Indian interests, the DOI made what was described in testimony as a 'judgment
call." The court called this a misconception of the legal requirements
involved in the decision, and wrote:
A "judgment call" was. simply not legally permissible. The
Secretary's duty was not to determine a basis for allocating water
between the [Truckee-Carson Irrigation] District and the Tribe in a
manner that hopefully everyone could live with for the year
ahead ....
[Tihe Secretary was required to resolve the conflicting
clims in a precise manner that would indicate the weight given
each interest before him.... The Secretary's action is therefore
doubly defective and irrational because it fails to demonstrate an
adequate recognition of his fiduciary duty to the Tribe. This also is
an abuse of discretion and not in accordance with the law?'
Despite the strong words concerning the Secretary's inappropriate action, the
remedy to the problem - a decision made based on a better accounting of the
interests taken into consideration - seems inadequate. It is tempting to read
"the most exacting fiduciary standards '" as being equivalent to the duty a
lawyer owes a client. If that were the case, well-established ethical guidelines
would determine whether the lawyer could continue to represent the client
when faced with a conflict of interest.' In a case like Pyramid Lake Paiute,
if the Secretary had been a lawyer representing the tribal interests, it is
unlikely that any court would allow the Secretary to take on the competing
198. 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.C.C.) (mere.), modified, 360 F. Supp 669 (D.D.C 1973), rev'd in
part, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974). cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975).
199. id. at 256-58.
200. Id. at 256.
291. Id. at 256-57.
202. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286. 297 (1942).
203. See, e.g., MODELCODE OF PROFESSIONAL RsPONSiBiLrrY DR 5-101(A), DR 5-105(A),
(B), (B)(2) (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rules 1.7, 1.16(a)(1) (1983)
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party as a client - and then make a decision that would bind each client
without getting either client's consent!
Yet, the Supreme Court set aside this type of conflict as a non-issue, unless
Congress addresses the problem. In Nevada v. United States,' which arose
from the same conflict as the Pyramid Lake Paiute case, Justice Rehnquist
resolved the apparent conflict of interest with deference to congressional choice:
[I]t may well appear that Congress was requiring the Secretary of
the Interior to carry water on at least two shoulders when it
delegated to him both the responsibility for the supervision of the
Indian tribes and the commencement of reclamation projects in
areas adjacent to reservation lands. But Congress chose to do this,
and it is simply unrealistic to suggest that the Government may not
perform its obligation to represent Indian tribes in litigation when
Congress has obliged it to represent other interests as well. In this
regard, the Government cannot follow the fastidious standards of a
private fiduciary, who would breach his duties to his single
beneficiary solely by representing other interests as well. The
Government does not "compromise" its obligation to one interest
that Congress obliges it to represent by the mere fact that it
simultaneously performs another task for another interest that
Congress has obligated it by statute to do.'
The red flag in this statement seems to be the bald statement of what the
government cannot do, without any reference to a constitutional limitation.
There is no apparent reason why "the Government cannot follow the fastidious
standards of a private fiduciary," and Rehnquist gives none.' On the contrary,
it is perhaps exactly this standard of behavior that is demanded by the Court in
Seminole Nation v. United States, where Justice Murphy wrote,
204. 463 U.S. 110, 127-28 (1983) (barring a water rights claim on the basis of res judicata,
and addressing the issue of ihe conflict of interest between branches of the federal government
with regard to representing Indian interests).
205. Id.
206. Nevada need not be read in quite such alarmist terms, however.
As bad as Nevada is, we should be careful to give it its narrowest reading,
especially since later cases, like Mitchell i [United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S.
206 (1983)] have endorsed that reading. Nevada at its narrowest is a res judicata
case and involves the situation in which Congress has explicitly authorized the
Secretary of the Interior to undertake duties that would be a conflict otherwise -
[that is, to] represent tribes and represent water users.... When the Bureau [of
Indian Affairs] is told to manage trust funds, for example, the highest standard is
still required.
Letter from Nell Jessup Newton, Dean, University of Denver Law School, to the author (Oct. 25,
1999) (on file with the author).
207. 316 U.S. 286 (1942).
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[Tihis court has recognized the distinctive obligation of trust
incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these
dependent and sometimes exploited people. In carrying out its
treaty obligations with the Indian tribes, the Government is
something more than a mere contracting party. Under a humane
and self imposed policy which has found expression in many acts
of Congress and numerous decisions of this Court, it has charged
itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust.
Its conduct, as disclosed in the acts of those who represent it in
dealings with the Indians, should therefore be judged by the most
exacting fiduciary standards.'
More recently, in United States v. Mitchell,' an opinion issued several years
after Nevada, the Court held that:
a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises when the Government
assumes such elaborate control over forests and property belonging
to Indians. All of the necessary elements of a common-law trust are
present: a trustee (the United States), a beneficiary (the Indian
allottees),and a trust corpus (Indian timber, lands, and funds)."'
From this latter decision it seems clear that Rehnquist's dismissal of the problem
of conflicting interests does not go so far as to eviscerate the trust relationship.
But this makes sense: Rehnquist approves of the trust relationship, at least to
the extent that it serves to limit Indian power. This becomes clear when
Rehnquist's most obvious alternative is examined.
For the government to extract itself from the conflict of interest, it would
have to change the nature of its relationship with tribes. This is why it is
"simply unrealistic" to demand that the government abide by ethical guidelines
that are de riguer in the private sector: disposing of the trust system introduces
questions of what such sovereignty would look like without the paternal federal
government as a check on tribal sovereignty. Rehnquist fails to explain this
because, although he does not shy away from judicial activism, he does not
want to upset a system that gives lip service to tribal sovereignty while keeping
tribes under tight federal control. It may be that the Supreme Court's attachment
to the trust system of federal tribal management is related to its apparent distaste
for tribal self-governance, however, this is only one small part of federal and
tribal dedication to the trust system. Further exploration of problems with the
trust system is beyond the scope of this article.2t' However, it is clear that the
208. d. at 296-97.
209. 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
210. d. at 225. The court also noted that the trust relationship exists "'though nothing is said
expressly in the authorizing or underlying statute... about a trust fund, or a trust or fiduciary
connection."' Id. (quoting Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 224 Ct. Ci. 171, 183 (1980)).
211. Federal obligations and their relation to consultation issues are discussed further,
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conflicts of interest that tribes endure are a side effect of that system, and
political realities suggest that this system will not soon change.
Nevada recognizes the long-standing (and arguably racist) exception to a
trustee's duty when the trustee is the government and the "beneficiaries" are
tribes. Rehnquist does little more than define what a conflict of interest is -
without bothering to examine why such conflicts pose ethical (or bureaucratic)
challenges - and then dismisses the issue so long as Congress sees fit to allow
these conflicts to continue. Yet, the exception is in fact a misreading of
Supreme Court precedent and congressional actions which, as the canon of
construction goes, err in favor of tribes.
The Nevada decision has a subtle but extensive reach: Rehnquist eliminates
a key benefit of the trust relationship for tribes, that being the service of a
dedicated and ethically responsible trustee, apparently without disturbing the
"trust" relationship's other aspects, many of which are not very desirable for
tribes.2t2 Further, the decision effectively bookends any further judicial effort
to eliminate such a conflict. Therefore, federal agencies will likely continue to
have inter- and intra-agency conflicts of interest that there remains no clear
judicial means to resolve, and the losers, no matter what the issue being
decided, invariably will be tribes.
B. Consultations as a Tool of Bureaucratic Inertia
Consultations may be used by federal bureaucracies to hinder progress by
their very existence. One long-time tribal official reported to a Senate
committee:
We may have reached a point at which the Bureau [of Indian
Affairs] has discovered that its best defense is the very thing it has
for so long feared - tribal consultation. The Bureau is now able
to use the apparent conflicts among the views of different tribes as
an irrefutable reason for inaction 
13
however, at infra Part VI.
212. Aspects which, on the whole, are not beneficial: the "guardian ... ward" relationship
established by Marshall's Cherokee Nation v. Georgia cannot in this day be seen as anything but
a harmful paradigm on which to base a relationship between nations.
213. Testimony of Phillip Martin, supra note 1. Martin also stated, glumly:
I need to preface my remarks by stating that, with over 35 years' experience in
tribal government relations with the Bureau, I am not hopeful about the possibility
of truly reforming it. Over the years I have participated in many exercises ... in
which tribes have told the Bureau how to reorganize itself; and all have resulted
in frustration and a cosmetically-changed Bureau. As time has gone on. the BIA
has got smarter about defending itself.
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Another observer reported to the same committee, "the Bureau of Indian Affairs
has no consistent philosophy regarding the obligation of consultation and the
provision of information to Indian tribes and people."""
An especially notable complaint comes from a tribe involved in an ongoing
effort to establish a reservation in the Death Valley area of California. The
Timbisha-Shoshone tribe claims that several hundred thousand acres in and
around what is now Death Valley National Monument constituted their
aboriginal homelands, but since 1933 the tribe has been relegated to a forty-acre
plot in lieu of a permanent reservation.!2 5 In 1994, the California Desert
Protection Act included a provision that instructed the Secretary of the Interior
to identify "lands suitable for a reservation," with specific instruction that the
Secretary work "in consultation with the Tribe.'1 6 In a press release, Acting
Tribal Chairperson and tribal elder Pauline Esteves made these comments about
the consultations that resulted:
It was one long eleven-month "charade." Those pasty-faced
bureaucrats knew from the beginning that they would not restore
ancestral lands to us. They sat there through presentation after
presentation by the Tribe, fooling us into believing that there could
be a sincere dialogue between the federal government and its
constituents. We spent over a hundred thousand dollars, hiring the
best anthropologists, historians, lawyers and economic consultants,
gathering data, establishing the "suitability" of segments of our
traditional homelands proposed to be taken into trust. We made
countless proposals. We got nothing of substance back, no effort on
their part to even meet us part way. Instead of dialogue and a
respectful exchange of ideas, we were stonewalled. Instead of a
commitment to right an old wrong, to fulfill the government's trust
responsibility to this nation's first people, this Democratic
Administration has used its enormous power to clobber us.!"
While the scope of these problems is debatable, the frustrations could not be
more clear. Further, the charges leveled against the BIA can be read in the
context of the agency's widely known reputation for exemplifying the worst
stereotypes of bureaucratic inertia. Given what has already been noted about the
uncertain nature of consultation requirements, it is not surprising to find
evidence that they may be twisted to fit the uses of government bureaucrats.
214. Prepared Statement of Carey N. Vicenti, Chief Judge, Jacarilla Apache Tribe, Former
Special Assistant for Tribal Justice, Support Office of Tribal Services, Bureau of Indian Affairs.,
Before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs Oversight Hearing on the Implementation !f the
Indian Tribal Justice Act, P.L. 103-176, FED. NEws. SERV., Aug. 2, 1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Arcnws File.
215. j'd.
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There is, however, testimony to the effect that these problems are avoidable:
"[E]arly consultation with the public and affected States and Tribes ... can help
save money by identifying important issues and avoiding unnecessary or
insufficient analyses. We anticipate cost savings from these initiatives of at least
$9.0 million over the next five years."2 '
Consultations may lead to enlightened policy choices, but perhaps this result
occurs only when consultations are overseen by those already aware of - and
interested in pursuing - their most laudatory exercise. The fate of Indian
interests should not pivot on the random chance that consultations will be
overseen by enlightened civil servants.
C. Failure to Account for Erroneous Decision-Making
An agency that carefully, and in good faith, considers every decision it
makes is not necessarily equipped, by that effort alone, to make the best or even
the right decisions. However, a certain amount of human error in decision-
making is acceptable. Additionally, there is no reliable mechanism available to
measure the wisdom of a decision, and even apparently wise decisions may
sometimes render the least favorable results. Nevertheless, we take exception to
egregious errors, and have codified remedies.
But what if we have no reliable mechanism available to alarm us to
egregious errors? That is, what if we make egregious errors, consistently over
time, yet we fail to appreciate the errors as such? This situation could arise
from a system that has no checks and balances or self-regulating mechanisms.
Or, it could result from a fundamental lack of understanding of the decision
being made; that is, one option is not fully appreciated by the decision maker
and is thus dismissed prematurely in favor of the more familiar option. I briefly
discuss both issues, and address this latter problem as a question of
"incommensurability."
1. Absence of Adequate Checks on Administrative Decision-Making
a) The Remote Possibility of Judicial Review
One noted administrative law commentator has written, "Itihe availability of
judicial review is the necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a
system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate, or legally
valid." 9 That "necessary condition" is available in only the most limited sense
with regard to the review of decisions made in consultation with tribes.
As with any administrative action, to challenge a federal agency decision
with regard to consultation, the challenger must first exhaust all administrative
remedies. Once that process is complete, the unsatisfied challenger must either
218. Testimony of Robert Nordhaus, supra note 5.
219. Christopher C. Taintor, Federal Agency Nonacquiescence: Defining and Enforcing
Constitutional Limitations on Bad Faith Agency Adjudication, 38 ME. L. REV. 185, 185 (1986).
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(1) find procedural grounds on which to challenge, or (2) show the decision was
so egregious as to be an abuse of the administration's discretion.
Procedural grounds include the failure to consult,' the agency making a
decision before the consultation is scheduled," or failure to make a good faith
effort to evaluate a site for its value as a cultural resource.m However, federal
agencies that are careful to follow the prescribed procedures may still "railroad
through" decisions, and leave no procedural hook on which to hang an appeal.
If an agency decision completely disregards the facts, has no rational basis,
or the decision incorporates authorization to act beyond the power of the issuing
agency to grant, it may be shown to violate the standards set by the APA. "
Under the APA, if a decision can be shown to be "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law,"' then the
decision may be overturned on review.
There are several problems with this system. First, exhausting administrative
remedies can be a long, expensive process that may be incompatible with the
flow of indigenous lifeways." Second, procedural errors may be hard to find,
and the remedies do not necessarily include a change in the decision. Third,
only under the "arbitrary or capricious" standard will the merits of the case be
the focus of the hearing by a federal judge. However, even then, this is a
relatively high hurdle, especially in view of the fact that consultations are
nonbinding, for advisory purposes only. These factors may mean that judicial
review remains a remote possibility in most cases, which undermines
administrative legitimacy to the extent of that remoteness.
b) Judicial Review and the Federal Trust Responsibility
As noted above, regardless of consultations, federal agencies are always
responsible to abide by the federal trust responsibility to Indians. The trust
responsibility creates in the federal government a heightened responsibility to
Indian nations with respect to federal decisions that affect Indian trust assets.
However, it is unclear to what extent the trust relationship limits federal
discretion, or by what mechanism adherence to that responsibility is enforced.
One commentator notes,
[T]he duty of protection is admittedly complex in the context of
agency implementation of general environmental or land and
resource management programs that have an impact on tribal
property rights. Full adherence to the trust responsibility is vitally
220. See, e.g., Attakai v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 1395, 1399 (D. Ariz. 1990).
221. See, e.g., Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1979).
222. See. e.g., Pueblo of Sandia v, United States, 50 F.3d 856 (10th Cir. 1995).
223. 5 U.S.C. §§ 704-706 (1994).
224. Id § 706.
225. See aLTo infra Part V.C.2 (discussion of incommensurability).
226. This topic is discussed further in Part V.C.I.b.
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important in this context, however, as a tribe's way of life can be
wholly destroyed by agency actions that impair the full use and
enjoyment of tribal property or treaty rights.... water rights,
fishing and hunting rights, and gathering rights are all tribal
property rights to which the federal government owes a duty of
protection.'
Yet, Indian complainants have no special means to challenge agency decisions.
Once an agency has made a decision, appeals may be made through the
agency's internal appeals process. Should that appeal fail to obtain favorable
results, the only way for agency decisions to be reviewed by a federal court is
under the statutory guidelines of the APA, which require that a decision be
"arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion" before a court will agree to
reverse the decision.tm
To illustrate how this plays out, consider how the Bureau of Reclamation
sums up its own review process from decisions made in accord with their
(internal, allegedly supposedly nonbinding) consultation policy:
Following the decision, the [Indian] community would have the
same channels of appeal open to other groups who disagree with
conclusions reached by an administrative agency: they can appeal
informally to the agency to reconsider its conclusions; or they can
appeal formally if they feel the agency has acted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner or that the agency failed to follow its own
procedures.'
That is, although Native Americans warrant consultation, they do not warrant
any further judicial review than that which is available to any other member of
the community who might want to challenge the decision. To put this in
perspective, remember that consultations are triggered when the decisions
"impact the value, use or enjoyment of' Indian trust assets.'m
It is important in this context to note that the Fifth Amendments Takings
Clause does not apply to takings of Indian trust lands for federal use, for the
227. Wood, supra note 81, at 744.
228. See 5 U.s.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994); see, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) ("[U]nder this standard, a reviewing court may not set
aside an agency rule that is rational, based on consideration of the relevant factors and within the
scope of the authority delegated to the agency by the statute.... The scope of review under the
'arbitrary and capricious' standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that
of the agency. Nevertheless, the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action including a'rational connection between the facts found and
the choices made!") (citations omitted).
229. INTERIOR DEP'r PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 87, at 13 (containing Bureau of
Reclamation Indian Trust Asset Policy and NEPA Implementing Procedures).
230. Id. at 9.
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simple reason that trust lands do not belong to any citizen, but rather to the
sovereign - thus no "taking" has occurred.
Now imagine a non-Indian American homeowner's response if they were to
hear that the federal government had decided to turn their backyard into a strip
mine, that they have no takings claim, and that if the want to have the decision
reviewed, they must meet the "arbitrary, capricious" standard.
In light of the federal trust responsibility, the APA's arbitrary and capricious
standard is far too high a standard to meet in order to be able to challenge
federal action. By dint of a judicial mechanism supposedly meant to protect
Indian interests, Indian nations have to meet a standard of review that we would
consider preposterously high for any other land owner. This standard of review
is incompatible with the trust responsibility: decisions regarding Indian trust
assets should be subject to an especially low standard of review in light of the
strict fiduciary duty that they command. Certainly "arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion" is a standard that neglects to correct many behaviors that
would be considered a breach of a strict fiduciary duty.
2. Incommensurability
In his acclaimed book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,"' Thomas
Kuhn argued that new scientific paradigms replace old ones by, among other
things, winning more arguments, making better predictions and describing the
state of the world more accurately.' However, in the period of crisis when
two paradigms are jostling for position, neither having yet been shown to be
clearly superior to the other, Kuhn says that the advocates of either position
cannot understand each other, because their understandings are
"incommensurable." 3 The advocate of each paradigm will reject the other's
arguments wholesale, because, judged by the understandings and standards of
the advocate's own paradigm, the other's arguments seem absurd, or fail some
test of the dominant paradigm.' That is, although the advocates of each
paradigm may use the same terminology, each uses it in a way that is so
completely incompatible with the others' understanding, that no prima facie
judgment can be made about whether the ideas of one advocate are "better than"
the ideas of the other. 5
This may be a useful context in which to understand the "competition"
between western culture and Native American culture. Whatever progress the
United States may claim toward the beneficent treatment of Native Americans,
fundamentally theirs is a cultural paradigm that we do not understand -
automatically, easily, or even with great effort. Kuhn might argue that because
231. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed, 1970).
232. Id. at 144.
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of our immersion in the dominant paradigm, we are unable to understand this
divergent paradigm without working to accept it on its own terms. That is, we
will find the practices, beliefs and terminology of the competing cultural
paradigm absurd when understood in reference to the dominant paradigm. Their
ideas are incommensurable with ours.'
Federal agencies have no established means of handling incommensurabili-
ties, and there is no judicial means to redress errors of judgment that issue from
such conflict.
Incommensurability plays a role in decisions that pit against each other
interests whose values cannot be compared. For instance, the value of a coal
mine, no matter what its expected dollar output, cannot in any meaningful way
be compared against the same area's value as a sacred site. Yet, federal agencies
must make such decisions, and readily do so, using the consultation process as
the lever to justify their final decision.
Professor Robert A. Williams, in his commentary on the Mt. Graham
telescope controversy, provides an example of how competing paradigms may
clash.m The controversy involved the proposed construction of astronomy
telescopes on the peaks of Mt. Graham in southeastern Arizona.' Pitted
against the construction were an array of environmentalists and members of
local Indian tribes, who publicized the otherwise almost certain extinction of the
Mt. Graham Red Squirrel - a federally listed endangered species - as one
reason not to complete the project. Williams writes,
As I learned from the scientists I got to know on the project,
conducting pure research in astronomical physics comes as close to
a religious calling as secular humanism can provide its
technological and scientific adherents. . . .It was a value, as I
quickly came to appreciate, so venerated by the institutional culture
of a major research university that to question the wisdom of
pursuing pure scientific research anywhere, even on a mountaintop
sustaining several diverse ecosystems and endangered species, is
regarded as near-blasphemy by the people who really matter at such
places.... Those environmentalists who had so vigorously opposed
their occupation of the mountain were acting as irrational fanatics
in their fetishistic idolatry of an inconsequential subspecies of
rodent. In the mythology generated by the Mt. Graham controversy,
it would be only fitting that when the large binocular telescope
crusaders finally triumphed over the tree-hugging New Age neo-
236. This distinction between "us" and "them" works regardless of which side of the cultural
gap you find yourself on.
237. Robert A. Williams, Essays on Environmental Justice: Large Binocular Telescopes, Red
Squirrel Piffatas, and Apache Sacred Mountains: Decolonizing Environmental Law in a
Multicultural World, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 1133 (1994).
238. Id. at 1134.
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luddites, the victory would be commemorated by the exquisite
symbology represented by the mythical story of the destruction of
a Red Squirrel pifiata.
Williams points out not only that the competing paradigms that would decide
the fate of the mountain - and its endangered rodent population - did not
understanding each other, but that the decision-making system was inherently
biased toward the interests of one paradigm over the other.
Unlike the mystically-revered values of free speech, religious
freedom, or bodily integrity, which are protected by the courts from
the majoritarian, log-rolling political processes of day-to-day
democratic government, the system of values which has colonized
our environmental law concedes the last word on how to protect a
place like Mt. Graham to the political process. . . .mhe Mt.
Graham Red Squirrel never had a chance of surviving unmolested
in its mountain habitat. Nor could it even hope to carry the load of
assisting the public and policymakers in imagining what makes
preserving Mt. Graham important from our perspective as human
beings. Given the terms of the debate and the symbols available for
waging the war for Mt. Graham, the mountain was destined for
colonization by the large binocular telescope crusaders.
The "terms of the debate and the symbols available" were those of the dominant
paradigm, which the environmentalists' competing paradigm could not displace
in the course of a single conflict. The momentum of the environmental
movement suggests, at least, that more people understand the rough outline of
that competing paradigm. However, that vague understanding is a far cry from
a serious effort to examine and remedy cultural bias as it affects the way the
United States makes decisions in its courtrooms and administrative bodies.
The Mt. Graham controversy also involved Native American interest in the
sacred value of Mt. Graham, which members of the San Carlos Apache
described as the home of the "elemental forces of the universe" represented by
spiritual beings called the "Gaans.""' The Gaans would reportedly be upset
should the mountain be disturbed, and in response the Gaans would wreak
havoc on the world. Williams writes:
[O]ur environmental law subjects these Indian visions of
environmental justice to a political process, which presents these
myths and narratives in a simplified and pejorative way....
239. Id. at 1138.
240. Id. at 1148-49 (emphasis supplied).
241. Id. at 1150-51.
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*.. It dismisses these visions through various mechanisms which
have institutionalized environmental racism against Indian peoples
at the deepest levels of our society.
... [T]he process by which Indian peoples, be they Apaches or
members of'other tribes, were supposed to voice their visions on
their connections to Mt. Graham had been, in effect, colonized by
a system of values antithetical to achieving environmental justice
for Indian peoples.'
The antithetical system of values seems to be in essence a competing paradigm,
which, viewed in light of the dominant paradigm, seems absurd, or at least
couched in a context that subscribers of to the competing paradigm would
consider "pejorative."
Legal commentator Richard Warner defines "incommensurability" thus:
"Reasons are incommensurable when (and only when) they are not comparable
as better, worse, or equally good."2' Warner argues that "rational choice
theory makes the wrong predictions where incommensurability is involved."'2
For instance, should he be offered an ever increasing amount of money for the
sale of his daughter, a cost-benefit analysis might predict that at some point, the
value the money would outweigh the value of the his love for his daughter.
However, the prediction is wrong, in the sense that it is made on the basis of
a balancing of values that, Warner says, never happens: he excludes money as
a reason, and so no cost-benefit analysis takes place.
Federal decision makers, immersed in the dominant paradigm, are not
equipped to make decisions that give the appropriate consideration to Native
American interests. For instance, a coal mine, which can produce a commodity
the value of which can be easily measured, and moreover, easily appreciated by
the decision maker, will always be chosen over preservation of the sacred site,
the value of which is either (1) erroneously and severely undervalued by the
dominant capitalist paradigm, or (2) not appreciated as having inherent value by
the dominant Judeo-Christian paradigm. 4 5 Either way, the sacred site is likely
to be sacrificed on the basis of a balancing test the outcome of which was
predetermined by the perceptual parameters of the decision maker, not the
inherent value of the choices compared. That is, the balancing test is between
242. Id at 1135, 1157, 1158-59.
243. Richard Warner, Impossible Comparisons and Rational Choice Theory, 68 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1705, 1706 (1995).
244. Id. at 1721.
245. For an excellent discussion of the Christian concept of man's project being a struggle
to conquer and thereby impart value to the wasteland, and the implications of that paradigm for
race relations and environmental degradation, see Williamson B.C. Chang, The "Wasteland" in
the Western Exploitation of "Race" and the Environment, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 849 (1992).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
incommensurable ideas, competing paradigms, of what the world, or the
particular site, is worth.
At this juncture, it is informative to review a relevant section of President
Clinton's directive of April 29, 1994: "As executive departments and agencies
undertake activities affecting Native American tribal rights or trust resources,
such activities should be implemented in a knowledgeable, sensitive manner
respectful of tribal sovereignty." However well-meaning, asking federal agencies
to work in a "knowledgeable, sensitive manner respectful of tribal sovereignty"
falls far short of an earnest attempt to grapple with incommensurable terms.
"Knowledgeable" and "sensitive" do not establish justifiable standards; rather,
they are normative terms that will ultimately be decided politically at best, and
ignored at worst.
D. Masking the Federal Trust Responsibility
When an agency implements a procedural consultation policy, the effect
may be that the agency neglects its trust responsibility while giving the
appearance of full compliance. One commentator notes,
Though most [agencies] explicitly recognize the duty of protection
stemming from the trust responsibility, many call for merely
procedural steps to safeguard tribal interests by requiring, for
example, consultation with tribal governments.... Such directives
fail to reflect the full trust responsibility, the essence of which
incorporates a substantive obligation on the party of every agency
to fully protect Indian property interests. Interpreting the trust
obligation as merely a procedural mandate makes it nearly
inevitable that the implementation of programs will benefit the
majority society at the expense of the tribes.'
The author recommends some sort of "prioritization scheme" to check this
problem; "[flailure to do so will very likely result in the incremental loss of
Indian rights behind a curtain of administrative discretion."' Tribes may
claim a breach of the trust relationship whenever it occurs, consultations or no.
There is serious a question, however, as to the practicality of such a solution,
given -the innumerable federal agency actions in a year, and the expense of
litigating even one.
The trust responsibility should be integral to federal decision-making, not an
afterthought appended to the decision when and if a concerned tribe has the
resources to take the government to court.
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VI. Proposal: Consultations as Adjudications
We demand of an adjudicative decision a kind of rationality we do
not expect of the results of contract or voting.
_ Lon Fuller'
I propose that consultations, understood in tandem with the federal agency
decision it predicates, function as a form of adjudication. This proposal allows
an examination of consultations within a useful analytical structure, using
references to standards applicable to a conceptually familiar system. This
comparison may also facilitate a discussion about how this form of adjudication
could be improved upon.
A. Consultations and Adjudications Compared: an Illustration
A comparison of consultations and adjudications shows a fit between the
elements of each. Both have parties with adverse interests, both are resolved by
a (nominally) neutral decision maker, and both can substantially effect the use
of Indian trust assets. To illustrate this comparison, imagine a hypothetical
conflict that requires a decision regarding the use of Bureau of Land
Manipulation (BLM) land. The case involves an Indian nation, that has statutory
claims to aboriginal homelands, and a mining company, that owns the mineral
rights to the area. 9 The Indian claim is based on a federal statute that
requires the BLM to set aside a reservation area for the tribe on the tribe's
"aboriginal territory and sacred sites." The mining claim is based on a mineral
exploration permits granted by the BLM, and the mining company's investment-
backed expectation that a mineral lease will be granted if requested. The tribe
can demonstrate that if the mining proceeds, its aboriginal territory and sacred
sites will be destroyed, and it will be impossible to effectuate the federal statute.
The mining company can show that if the mining does not proceed, a multi-
million-dollar investment will be lost, and the BLM will fail its congressional
mandate to maximize opportunities for logging and mining.
First, suppose that this case goes to court. The suit might arise in a number
of different forms, with either party attempting to enjoin one action by the BLM
or the other. Importantly, the BLM could be a defendant; for instance, the
Indian nation could name the BLM as a defendant should BLM grant the
mineral lease. In whatever manner the case arises, the adjudication creates a
familiar triangular relationship between two adverse parties and a neutral
decision maker - in this case a federal judge. Both parties have an equal
footing before the court, and the judge is unlikely to be affected by many of the
248. Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 367 (1978).
249. This hypothetical is based loosely on an actual conflict, involving a mining company
and the Timbisha-Shoshone tribe. Some facts have been changed for the sake of simplicity.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
vagaries and biases that may plague agencies (although the incommensurability
problem is likely to remain. And this is not to suggest that any given judge is
without biases and prejudices.).
Next, suppose instead that the conflict is handled by the BLM acting alone
as a federal decision maker. Several changes are immediately noticeable. First,
the BLM may or may not be a neutral decision maker, for any or all of the
reasons discussed above. Second, and in a related vein, while the various
interests are still adverse, the identity of the named parties may change because
of the BLM's role as decision maker. Because the BLM is a key player no
matter what the specific facts are, the BLM is likely to be more naturally
aligned with the agenda of one party over the other. It is easy to see which
party is likely to prevail: the mining company probably deals with the BLM at
various other sites, and undoubtedly exerts its presence through political
channels, while the Indian nation, which enjoys less political and financial
capital, is easily relegated to the minor role of "consultee" with no significant
political fallout or friction.
Third, the procedure in making the decision changes. The BLM has largely
unfettered discretion to choose among the options presented, given that the
conflicting congressional mandates arguably cancel each other out of the
equation. Perhaps the Indian nation will be able to challenge the disregard of
the federal statue that would set aside reservation land, but that assumes they
have the resources and resolve to engage an expensive legal battle. Further, so
long as BLM agents dutifully consult with the Indian nation, and records the
reasoning used to reach its conclusion, it is unlikely that the decision could be
challenged on the "arbitrary, capricious" standard of the APA. Instead of suing
to enjoin a BLM action, the Indian nation must now plead its case to BLM
agents, who are not required to incorporate Indian suggestions in their final
decision.
In this quick sketch, it is perhaps easier to see the differences than the
commonalties between an adjudication and a consultation paired with a federal
agency decision. It is also difficult to fail to observe the many potential sources
for injustices with consultations. However, in both procedural situations, the
adverse interests remain; it is the shift in decision makers and the consequent
change in procedure that so dramatically changes the texture of the conflict. In
the next section, I provide a structure to better analyze the elements of an
adjudication, as a means to further clarify the comparison.
B. Fuller's Optimal Adjudications and Consultations
Commentator Lon Fullers article The Forms and Limits of Adjudicatione'
provides a workable definition of adjudication, which deals with "adjudication
250. See supra Part V.
251. Fuller, supra note 248.
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in the very broadest sense." 'Fuller defines adjudication, and then addresses
the limits of adjudication - "what kinds of tasks can properly be assigned to
courts and other adjudicative agencies?" - and its forms - "[w]hat are the
permissible variations in the forms of adjudication?"'
Fuller begins with an effort to define "true adjudication," as perhaps it never
exists, as a means of creating a standard by which to compare various attempts
to create adjudicative processes. He proposes that:
the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that
it confers on the affected party a peculiar form of participation in
the decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for
a decision in his favor. Whatever heightens the significance of this
participation lifts adjudication toward its optimum expression.
Whatever destroys the meaning of that participation destroys the
integrity of adjudication itself. Thus, participation through reasoned
argument loses its meaning if the arbiter of the dispute is
inaccessible to reason because he is insane, has been bribed, or is
hopelessly prejudiced.'
By this description, then, adjudication has two elements: (1) the conferral on the
affected party of a right to participate in the decision being made, and (2)
presentation by the affected party of reasoned arguments designed to persuade
the decision maker.
1. What Rights are Conferred by Consultation Requirements?
The crux of the consultation problem may be wrapped-up in the search for
an answer to the first element of Fuller's description of adjudications: what
rights, if any, are conferred, and on what party, where consultation requirements
exist? This is a different version of the same question broached earlier in the
section discussing the "meaning" or consultations. As noted previously,"
courts have recognized the violation of consultation rights as a redressable
injury, both in cases where the rights were clearly drawn by statute, and where
the rights were derived from supposedly unenforceable internal agency policies.
The few statutes that create consultation requirements leave the courts to
decide what impact the requirements may have. In Pueblo of Sandia,e ' the
court held that a statutorily created consultation requirement demanded
something more than a consultation rendered meaningless by the ignorance of
252. Ud at 353.
253. l at 354.
254. Id. at 357.
255. l at 364.
256. See supra Part III.
257. See supra Part IV.C.
258. See supra Part IV.A.6.
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the Indian interlocutor. If what makes consultations meaningful is that the
decision maker gains by having consulted an informed interlocutor, then it
seems to follow that a federal agent is not allowed to completely ignore the
input of the informed interlocutor. To completely ignore the information
provided would put the agent in roughly the same place as he would have been
in had he (kiowingly) consulted with an uninformed interlocutor, and that is a
result the court prohibits.
Agency policies include clauses that deny the creation of any rights, but the
effectiveness of these disclaimers may be a litigable issue. Finally, there has
been an explosion in the number of federal regulations that include consultation
requirements.' While Indian nations may have more success enforcing the
right to have these consultations, it remains - as always - an open question
what impact these consultations will have on the decision maker.
2. "Reasoned Arguments for a Decision in His Favor ....
With regard to the second element, consultations involve whatever
presentation to the federal agency the tribe calculates will benefit its interests,
and that certainly may include "proofs and reasoned argument." Whenever
possible, tribes argue that a project infringes interests protected by statute, treaty
or long-standing custom. However, there may be a problem with "reasoned
argument" insofar as the other party to the consultation - the decision-making
agency - may be unable to consider Indian advice fairly and evenhandedly.
That is, the "participation through reasoned argument loses its meaning if the
arbiter of the dispute is inaccessible to reason because he... has been bribed,
or is hopelessly prejudiced." It has already been discussed how agencies may
be subject to bias that is objectionable in any context, and that would be fatal
to proper adjudications.
3. Less than Optimal Adjudications
In light of the problems with federal agency administration of consultations,
there are significant problems that correlate with each of Fuller's two requisites
for quality adjudications. First, it is not clear that consultation requirements
259. See INTERIOR DEPIr PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 87. The Interior Secretary's
Order No. 3175, which ordered the creation of consultation policies by each Interior Department
agency, includes the following disclaimer. "This Order is for internal management guidance only,
and shall not be construed to grant or vest any right to any party in respect to any Federal action
not otherwise granted or vested by existing law or regulations." Id. at app. However, it goes on
to provide, "Bureaus and offices are required to consult with the recognized tribal government
with jurisdiction over the trust property that the proposal may affect, the appropriate office of the
.Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Office of the Solicitor (for legal assistance) if their evaluation
reveals any impacts on Indian trust resources." Id. There would seem to be a colorable claim that
somebody must have a legal right to enforce such a requirement, and indeed, the Oglala Sioux
and Hoopa Valley courts disagreed on the resolution of an almost identical issue.
260. See supra note I.
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always, in most cases, or even in a sizable minority of cases, create an
enforceable right in the Indian parties to participate. Second, assuming Indian
parties do participate, it is perhaps even less clear that there is a bona fide
opportunity to present arguments that stand a chance of persuading the decision
maker. Federal agency decision makers may be, in Fuller's words, "hopelessly
prejudiced."
So it would seem that consultations fail to meet the requirements for either
of the two prongs of Fuller's definition of a "true" adjudication. This does not
necessarily show that the consultation process is not a species of adjudicative
proceeding. Rather, if Fuller's definition is an expression of the optimal
expression of adjudication, then we can conclude that consultations are
decidedly not optimal. Nevertheless, it remains the case that where consultations
are required, they are a procedural prelude to a decision in which one party -
be it a federal agency or a private interest seeking federal agency approval -
seeks to engage in some project that may be adverse to Indian interests or trust
assets. So, the equation with adjudications makes sense intuitively, as a contest
between adverse parties that is resolved by a decision maker. Moreover,
consultations do provide some right to participate in a decision, however
attenuated and unenforceable those rights, and however compromised the
decision maker.
As Fuller notes of adjudications, "Whatever heightens the significance of this
participation lifts adjudication toward its optimum expression." So too with
consultations. The question then becomes, "whatever, indeed, will lift
consultations toward its optimum expression." The Pueblo of Sandia case
suggests how courts might shape consultations in the interest of fairness.
Ultimately, however, it seems legislative action would be required to make the
substantial changes necessary to overhaul a system that is simply inadequate for
the task required of it.
VI. Commentary
Given the problems outlined here, and given the ever-present fact that
consultation rights where they do exist ultimately create no substantive duty on
the part of the agency, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that "consultation"
is the latest federal codeword for lip service. But the evidence suggests that they
amount to something worse.
By mimicking substantive participation, consultations have the disquieting
effect of masking larger problems with the manner in which the United States
government deals with Indian nations. Consultation requirements bookmark
places where federal decision-making infringes on Indian trust assets, and at
present that infringement occurs with inadequate hearing or review.
Consultations undermine, demean and displace a thorough commitment to the
federal trust responsibility, which itself is an archaic and inadequate protection
for Indian interests.
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Consultations subject Indian interests to conflicts of interest within federal
agencies, workaday political log-rolling, and may be the source of bureaucratic
inertia. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the evidence suggests that few consultation
policies have been formulated in consultation with Indians. For all these
drawbacks, the big payoff that consultations provide is the meager opportunity
for Native Americans to express their opinions and desires - with no guarantee
that their input will be fully considered or even respected.
The process of government-to-government communication suggested by
current federal Indian policy is a laudatory goal. However, an ill-defined
consultation policy is no substitute for increased recognition of tribal
sovereignty, or substantive federal commitments to defend tribal interests. While
consultations may be inadequate to provide native nations the voice they
deserve, it is staggering to consider the many decades that Indians were not
even allowed this much say in the policies that so intimately affect their lives.
Consultation requirements are seemingly part remedy for and part symptom of
these years of neglect. Congress must recognize that mere consultations are not
enough by way of remedy, and that problems with consultations evidence a
much broader malaise that must be addressed.
Nevertheless, the recent popularity of consultation requirements suggests they
may be here for some time. If so, one course of progress - the legalistic
course-- would be to begin the process of raising consultations to their optimal
expression as a legal device. I suggest that such expression would share the
same characteristics as optimal adjudications.
The more drastic, and perhaps more difficult, course would be to recognize
"consultations" for the dangerous disservice to Native American interests that
they are, and root out this spurious procedure wherever it is found. This would
force a hard look at what rights and responsibilities Congress meant to give to
tribal nations in the first place, and what corresponding rights Congress is
willing to cede. This option lands the discussion squarely in the realm of
political maneuvering, which is where perhaps all Indian issues have historically
been decided, so often for the worse.
However, whatever features the resolution of this problem may include, it
would seem that the best way to determine the future course of federal-tribal
relations must surely be to formulate the solutions in partnership with Indian
nations.
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